The CCS Bibliography cites publications and presentations known to utilize the CCS. If you know of a citation that is missing, please send us an e-mail at help@comparativecandidates.org.
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2024
(21)
Strategic choices and electoral gains: unpacking constituency campaign effectiveness in Germany's mixed-member electoral system.
Angenendt, M.; and Bukow, S. U.
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,1–21. April 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{angenendt_strategic_2024, title = {Strategic choices and electoral gains: unpacking constituency campaign effectiveness in {Germany}'s mixed-member electoral system}, issn = {1745-7289, 1745-7297}, shorttitle = {Strategic choices and electoral gains}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2024.2337437}, doi = {10.1080/17457289.2024.2337437}, abstract = {Election campaigns are a critical component of democratic competition, and existing literature has extensively discussed the rise in personalization and localization in recent campaigns. However, the extent to which campaign strategies influence electoral success remains controversial. Therefore, our study examined the impact of candidate – and constituency-centred campaigns on nominal and party-list votes in mixed-member electoral systems and investigated which strategies were most effective on election day. Our analysis draws on representative national candidate surveys for German federal elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017. Our findings indicate that personalized campaign communication significantly affects electoral success, with greater emphasis on the candidate than the party, resulting in increased nominal votes. Our results also suggest that parties benefit from personalized campaigns as they increase party-list votes as well. However, neither localized campaign issues nor candidate-centred campaign organization pay off in electoral terms. Furthermore, candidates’ party affiliation significantly influences electoral success, demonstrating the continued relevance of parties to campaign dynamics and electoral outcomes.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties}, author = {Angenendt, Michael and Bukow, Sebastian U.}, month = apr, year = {2024}, pages = {1--21}, }
Election campaigns are a critical component of democratic competition, and existing literature has extensively discussed the rise in personalization and localization in recent campaigns. However, the extent to which campaign strategies influence electoral success remains controversial. Therefore, our study examined the impact of candidate – and constituency-centred campaigns on nominal and party-list votes in mixed-member electoral systems and investigated which strategies were most effective on election day. Our analysis draws on representative national candidate surveys for German federal elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017. Our findings indicate that personalized campaign communication significantly affects electoral success, with greater emphasis on the candidate than the party, resulting in increased nominal votes. Our results also suggest that parties benefit from personalized campaigns as they increase party-list votes as well. However, neither localized campaign issues nor candidate-centred campaign organization pay off in electoral terms. Furthermore, candidates’ party affiliation significantly influences electoral success, demonstrating the continued relevance of parties to campaign dynamics and electoral outcomes.
Disagreeing to Agree: Populism and Consensus Among Members of Parliaments and Their Voters.
Pamies, C.; Olivas Osuna, J. J.; and Santana, A.
American Behavioral Scientist,00027642241285017. October 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{pamies_disagreeing_2024, title = {Disagreeing to {Agree}: {Populism} and {Consensus} {Among} {Members} of {Parliaments} and {Their} {Voters}}, issn = {0002-7642, 1552-3381}, shorttitle = {Disagreeing to {Agree}}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00027642241285017}, doi = {10.1177/00027642241285017}, abstract = {Populism is theoretically associated with an antagonistic interpretation of politics. Populists tend to morally delegitimize their adversaries, exhibit “bad manners” toward them, and sometimes even try to exclude them from “the people.” They are also more inclined to prioritize radical policy and institutional changes. Therefore, populism appears to be directly at odds with consensus politics. This research aims to empirically test this relationship. Using two original surveys focused on the Spanish context, we investigate the relationship between populist attitudes and the propensity to consensual political solutions, examining both citizens and their political representatives. Our results confirm that populist attitudes contribute to low support for consensual approaches toward politics among both members of parliament (MPs) and citizens, but this relationship depends on the individual’s specific dimensions of populism. Anti-systemic and moral Manichaean attitudes are associated with less consensual preferences both for MPs and citizens, whereas people-centrist and identitarian populist attitudes exhibit this negative effect only among citizens. These results provide new insights into the ramifications of populist attitudes and underscore the importance of empirically examining the concept of populism across its various dimensions.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {American Behavioral Scientist}, author = {Pamies, Carles and Olivas Osuna, José Javier and Santana, Andrés}, month = oct, year = {2024}, pages = {00027642241285017}, }
Populism is theoretically associated with an antagonistic interpretation of politics. Populists tend to morally delegitimize their adversaries, exhibit “bad manners” toward them, and sometimes even try to exclude them from “the people.” They are also more inclined to prioritize radical policy and institutional changes. Therefore, populism appears to be directly at odds with consensus politics. This research aims to empirically test this relationship. Using two original surveys focused on the Spanish context, we investigate the relationship between populist attitudes and the propensity to consensual political solutions, examining both citizens and their political representatives. Our results confirm that populist attitudes contribute to low support for consensual approaches toward politics among both members of parliament (MPs) and citizens, but this relationship depends on the individual’s specific dimensions of populism. Anti-systemic and moral Manichaean attitudes are associated with less consensual preferences both for MPs and citizens, whereas people-centrist and identitarian populist attitudes exhibit this negative effect only among citizens. These results provide new insights into the ramifications of populist attitudes and underscore the importance of empirically examining the concept of populism across its various dimensions.
Affective Polarization and Consensus Building Among Parliamentary Elites.
Sánchez-Ferrer, L.; and Torcal, M.
American Behavioral Scientist,00027642241285147. September 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{sanchez-ferrer_affective_2024, title = {Affective {Polarization} and {Consensus} {Building} {Among} {Parliamentary} {Elites}}, issn = {0002-7642, 1552-3381}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00027642241285147}, doi = {10.1177/00027642241285147}, abstract = {This article presents evidence that political representatives in Spain exhibit significant levels of affective polarization, drawing on data from a 2022 to 2023 survey of Spanish Members of Parliament (MPs) in the national and regional parliaments. These attitudes, measured by affective social distance from supporters of other parties, hinder parliamentary agreements but only in regional parliaments, a tendency that is especially visible among leftist and nationalist representatives toward supporters of the new radical right-wing party (VOX). By contrast, there is no evidence that affective social affinity is associated with less consensual attitudes. Given the absence of studies on affective polarization among political elites, these findings are important because they suggest that, although elites might contribute to the growing trends of pernicious polarization among their supporters and may deteriorate compromise at the regional level, this kind of polarization does not necessarily preclude consensus and agreement in national politics.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {American Behavioral Scientist}, author = {Sánchez-Ferrer, Leonardo and Torcal, Mariano}, month = sep, year = {2024}, pages = {00027642241285147}, }
This article presents evidence that political representatives in Spain exhibit significant levels of affective polarization, drawing on data from a 2022 to 2023 survey of Spanish Members of Parliament (MPs) in the national and regional parliaments. These attitudes, measured by affective social distance from supporters of other parties, hinder parliamentary agreements but only in regional parliaments, a tendency that is especially visible among leftist and nationalist representatives toward supporters of the new radical right-wing party (VOX). By contrast, there is no evidence that affective social affinity is associated with less consensual attitudes. Given the absence of studies on affective polarization among political elites, these findings are important because they suggest that, although elites might contribute to the growing trends of pernicious polarization among their supporters and may deteriorate compromise at the regional level, this kind of polarization does not necessarily preclude consensus and agreement in national politics.
Understanding Conflict Dynamics in Spanish Parliament: MPs’ Personality Traits and Attitudes Toward Conflict.
Galais, C.; and Bermúdez, S.
American Behavioral Scientist,00027642241285191. October 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{galais_understanding_2024, title = {Understanding {Conflict} {Dynamics} in {Spanish} {Parliament}: {MPs}’ {Personality} {Traits} and {Attitudes} {Toward} {Conflict}}, issn = {0002-7642, 1552-3381}, shorttitle = {Understanding {Conflict} {Dynamics} in {Spanish} {Parliament}}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00027642241285191}, doi = {10.1177/00027642241285191}, abstract = {This study addresses the gap in research on individual-level factors contributing to parliamentary conflict by developing a measure of members of parliaments’ (MPs) conflict attitudes and examining the role of personality traits. Utilizing a comprehensive framework and validated measures, we aim to provide insights into the factors influencing MPs’ propensity for conflict and resistance to consensus. Our findings reveal that personality traits related to Agreeableness and Machiavellianism are significant predictors of conflict attitudes. These results deepen our understanding of the micro-foundations of parliamentary conflict and inform strategies for promoting cooperation and constructive political behavior in legislatures.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {American Behavioral Scientist}, author = {Galais, Carol and Bermúdez, Sandra}, month = oct, year = {2024}, pages = {00027642241285191}, }
This study addresses the gap in research on individual-level factors contributing to parliamentary conflict by developing a measure of members of parliaments’ (MPs) conflict attitudes and examining the role of personality traits. Utilizing a comprehensive framework and validated measures, we aim to provide insights into the factors influencing MPs’ propensity for conflict and resistance to consensus. Our findings reveal that personality traits related to Agreeableness and Machiavellianism are significant predictors of conflict attitudes. These results deepen our understanding of the micro-foundations of parliamentary conflict and inform strategies for promoting cooperation and constructive political behavior in legislatures.
Millstone or means to succeed: party-brand value, intra-party competition and personal vote-seeking.
Däubler, T.; and Muineacháin, S. Ó
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 34(1): 96–115. January 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{daubler_millstone_2024, title = {Millstone or means to succeed: party-brand value, intra-party competition and personal vote-seeking}, volume = {34}, issn = {1745-7289, 1745-7297}, shorttitle = {Millstone or means to succeed}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2022.2080685}, doi = {10.1080/17457289.2022.2080685}, abstract = {Politicians will cultivate their personal vote if electoral rules foster competition within parties. We examine how the value of the party brand in the competition between parties affects how politicians attempt to build up their personal vote. Theoretically, if party valence is low, intra-party crowdedness intensifies, since a given number of candidates must vie for a smaller number of expected seats. In addition to this first mechanism, a poor party brand should generally (under weak assumptions about candidates’ beliefs) encourage less party-oriented and more person-oriented candidate campaigns. Empirically, we examine this argument in the context of the 2011 Irish legislative election. The incumbent Fianna Fáil struggled with its toxic party brand, as it was widely regarded as being responsible for the crash of the Celtic Tiger, whereas Fine Gael consistently led the polls. A content analysis of our own collection of campaign leaflets suggests that, in 2011, Fianna Fáil candidates ran much more personal campaigns than their Fine Gael counterparts, even when adjusting for the level of intra-party competition. For the campaign four years earlier, candidate survey data do not suggest such a difference. These findings suggest that low party valence contributes to personal vote-seeking.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties}, author = {Däubler, Thomas and Muineacháin, Séin Ó}, month = jan, year = {2024}, pages = {96--115}, }
Politicians will cultivate their personal vote if electoral rules foster competition within parties. We examine how the value of the party brand in the competition between parties affects how politicians attempt to build up their personal vote. Theoretically, if party valence is low, intra-party crowdedness intensifies, since a given number of candidates must vie for a smaller number of expected seats. In addition to this first mechanism, a poor party brand should generally (under weak assumptions about candidates’ beliefs) encourage less party-oriented and more person-oriented candidate campaigns. Empirically, we examine this argument in the context of the 2011 Irish legislative election. The incumbent Fianna Fáil struggled with its toxic party brand, as it was widely regarded as being responsible for the crash of the Celtic Tiger, whereas Fine Gael consistently led the polls. A content analysis of our own collection of campaign leaflets suggests that, in 2011, Fianna Fáil candidates ran much more personal campaigns than their Fine Gael counterparts, even when adjusting for the level of intra-party competition. For the campaign four years earlier, candidate survey data do not suggest such a difference. These findings suggest that low party valence contributes to personal vote-seeking.
Do candidates’ policy positions matter in regional elections? Evidence from the 2021 elections to the Welsh Senedd.
Wheatley, J.; and Germann, M.
Regional & Federal Studies,1–22. September 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{wheatley_candidates_2024, title = {Do candidates’ policy positions matter in regional elections? {Evidence} from the 2021 elections to the {Welsh} {Senedd}}, issn = {1359-7566, 1743-9434}, shorttitle = {Do candidates’ policy positions matter in regional elections?}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13597566.2024.2399694}, doi = {10.1080/13597566.2024.2399694}, abstract = {An oft-cited benefit of candidate-based elections is that voters can hold individual candidates accountable for their issue stances. However, voters may not always be aware of candidates’ policy positions, a concern which becomes especially salient in regional elections. Using mass online survey data and a fixed effects approach, we investigate the extent to which voters were influenced by the policy positions of individual candidates when voting in the 2021 elections to the Welsh Senedd. We find that candidates’ policy positions did matter, but that this effect was small, limited to issues voters deemed to be particularly important, and only emerges among voters with high political interest. That said, our findings also suggest that the influence of candidates’ policy positions on voting behaviour was not substantially smaller when compared to national elections in the UK and elsewhere. We discuss options for improving voter responsiveness to candidates’ issue stances.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, author = {Wheatley, Jonathan and Germann, Micha}, month = sep, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2015, WK-CHECK}, pages = {1--22}, }
An oft-cited benefit of candidate-based elections is that voters can hold individual candidates accountable for their issue stances. However, voters may not always be aware of candidates’ policy positions, a concern which becomes especially salient in regional elections. Using mass online survey data and a fixed effects approach, we investigate the extent to which voters were influenced by the policy positions of individual candidates when voting in the 2021 elections to the Welsh Senedd. We find that candidates’ policy positions did matter, but that this effect was small, limited to issues voters deemed to be particularly important, and only emerges among voters with high political interest. That said, our findings also suggest that the influence of candidates’ policy positions on voting behaviour was not substantially smaller when compared to national elections in the UK and elsewhere. We discuss options for improving voter responsiveness to candidates’ issue stances.
Choosing among the chosen? Electoral lists and party primaries in Europe.
Pamies, C.; and Cordero, G.
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 32(1): 96–109. January 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{pamies_choosing_2024, title = {Choosing among the chosen? {Electoral} lists and party primaries in {Europe}}, volume = {32}, issn = {1478-2804, 1478-2790}, shorttitle = {Choosing among the chosen?}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14782804.2023.2195619}, doi = {10.1080/14782804.2023.2195619}, abstract = {Primaries are becoming the preferred mechanism to select parliamentary elites in an increasing number of parties across Europe. Recent literature has shown that certain party-level characteristics favour the implementation of this inclusive method of selection. However, despite its great relevance in party life, the impact of the electoral system has not attracted enough attention. In this article we wonder if the type of electoral list (blocked or not blocked) has an effect on how participative the method of candidate selection is. We expect primaries to be more popular where electoral lists are blocked, as an intermediate mechanism for the electorate to influence an otherwise leadership-driven process of candidate selection. However, the results of a survey of 2,561 candidates from 37 parties show that this expectation is not met, as primaries seem to be more common precisely in non-blocked lists systems, with this effect being especially visible among right-wing parties. These findings suggest that the type of list might play a key role in this important aspect of internal party life.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Journal of Contemporary European Studies}, author = {Pamies, Carles and Cordero, Guillermo}, month = jan, year = {2024}, pages = {96--109}, }
Primaries are becoming the preferred mechanism to select parliamentary elites in an increasing number of parties across Europe. Recent literature has shown that certain party-level characteristics favour the implementation of this inclusive method of selection. However, despite its great relevance in party life, the impact of the electoral system has not attracted enough attention. In this article we wonder if the type of electoral list (blocked or not blocked) has an effect on how participative the method of candidate selection is. We expect primaries to be more popular where electoral lists are blocked, as an intermediate mechanism for the electorate to influence an otherwise leadership-driven process of candidate selection. However, the results of a survey of 2,561 candidates from 37 parties show that this expectation is not met, as primaries seem to be more common precisely in non-blocked lists systems, with this effect being especially visible among right-wing parties. These findings suggest that the type of list might play a key role in this important aspect of internal party life.
Polarization congruence and satisfaction with democracy: A multinational investigation.
Erol, F.; Ecevit, Y. A.; and Kocapınar, G.
Electoral Studies, 90: 102796. August 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{erol_polarization_2024, title = {Polarization congruence and satisfaction with democracy: {A} multinational investigation}, volume = {90}, issn = {02613794}, shorttitle = {Polarization congruence and satisfaction with democracy}, url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379424000544}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102796}, abstract = {The mass-elite congruence in politics is key to a healthy democracy. Existing research uses the match between citizens' ideological positions and those of political elites and parties to assess satisfaction with democracy over time and across countries. However, mass-elite ideological congruence does not necessarily guarantee mass-elite overlap in ideological polarization, the implications of which for democratic satisfaction are little known. Accordingly, our article examines the link between the mass-elite ideological polarization congruence and democratic satisfaction in a multinational context. We reason that when polarized electorates feel let down by their parties' depolarization, these ideologically polarized people would grow frustrated with the disconnected democratic system (seen as ineffective in meeting citizens' expectations and delivering meaningful political alternatives). Then, we find that electorates who do not consider their affiliated parties to be as ideologically polarized as themselves tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their countries. Our additional inquiries suggest that this democratic dissatisfaction parallels ambivalence in democratic commitment. We also find that the perception of no differences between parties, and affiliation with populist and losing parties amplifies these disappointed polarized electorates’ dissatisfaction with democracy.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, author = {Erol, Fatih and Ecevit, Yüksel Alper and Kocapınar, Gülnur}, month = aug, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COMPONENT-PES, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2019, WK-CHECK}, pages = {102796}, }
The mass-elite congruence in politics is key to a healthy democracy. Existing research uses the match between citizens' ideological positions and those of political elites and parties to assess satisfaction with democracy over time and across countries. However, mass-elite ideological congruence does not necessarily guarantee mass-elite overlap in ideological polarization, the implications of which for democratic satisfaction are little known. Accordingly, our article examines the link between the mass-elite ideological polarization congruence and democratic satisfaction in a multinational context. We reason that when polarized electorates feel let down by their parties' depolarization, these ideologically polarized people would grow frustrated with the disconnected democratic system (seen as ineffective in meeting citizens' expectations and delivering meaningful political alternatives). Then, we find that electorates who do not consider their affiliated parties to be as ideologically polarized as themselves tend to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their countries. Our additional inquiries suggest that this democratic dissatisfaction parallels ambivalence in democratic commitment. We also find that the perception of no differences between parties, and affiliation with populist and losing parties amplifies these disappointed polarized electorates’ dissatisfaction with democracy.
Candidates and Campaigning.
Söderlund, P.
In Political Behaviour in Contemporary Finland, pages 225–240. Routledge, London, 1 edition, February 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@incollection{von_schoultz_candidates_2024, address = {London}, edition = {1}, title = {Candidates and {Campaigning}}, isbn = {978-1-00-345228-7}, url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003452287/chapters/10.4324/9781003452287-18}, abstract = {Finnish voters express their preferences for specific candidates through preference voting. Individual candidates, therefore, have incentives to actively campaign for personal votes in addition to working towards winning votes for their parties. This chapter examines the variation in campaign styles among individual candidates at the constituency level in four Finnish parliamentary elections from 2007 to 2019. The analysis then delves into the factors that account for the differences in the level of campaign personalization across candidates. Data are from the international Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS), which collects data on the attitudes and behaviour of candidates running in national parliamentary elections. The findings reveal significant variations in campaign styles among the candidates. Some candidates adopt highly party-centred campaigns, while others focus more on candidate-centric approaches. Interestingly, campaigns appeared to have shifted towards greater party-centricity in the early 2010s, only to return to a more balanced mix of party-centred and candidate-centred campaigns by 2019. Although the magnitudes of the effects of explanatory variables are generally modest, one consistent finding emerges: elected local councillors are more likely to emphasize various campaign strategies.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, booktitle = {Political {Behaviour} in {Contemporary} {Finland}}, publisher = {Routledge}, author = {Söderlund, Peter}, collaborator = {Von Schoultz, Åsa and Strandberg, Kim}, month = feb, year = {2024}, doi = {10.4324/9781003452287-18}, pages = {225--240}, }
Finnish voters express their preferences for specific candidates through preference voting. Individual candidates, therefore, have incentives to actively campaign for personal votes in addition to working towards winning votes for their parties. This chapter examines the variation in campaign styles among individual candidates at the constituency level in four Finnish parliamentary elections from 2007 to 2019. The analysis then delves into the factors that account for the differences in the level of campaign personalization across candidates. Data are from the international Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS), which collects data on the attitudes and behaviour of candidates running in national parliamentary elections. The findings reveal significant variations in campaign styles among the candidates. Some candidates adopt highly party-centred campaigns, while others focus more on candidate-centric approaches. Interestingly, campaigns appeared to have shifted towards greater party-centricity in the early 2010s, only to return to a more balanced mix of party-centred and candidate-centred campaigns by 2019. Although the magnitudes of the effects of explanatory variables are generally modest, one consistent finding emerges: elected local councillors are more likely to emphasize various campaign strategies.
The Voice of the Absent? The Link Between Descriptive and Substantive Representation of the Working Class in Western Europe.
Hahn, C.
Political Studies, 72(2): 527–550. May 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{hahn_voice_2024, title = {The {Voice} of the {Absent}? {The} {Link} {Between} {Descriptive} and {Substantive} {Representation} of the {Working} {Class} in {Western} {Europe}}, volume = {72}, issn = {0032-3217, 1467-9248}, shorttitle = {The {Voice} of the {Absent}?}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00323217221126668}, doi = {10.1177/00323217221126668}, abstract = {Recent research has revealed a considerable representation gap disadvantaging the lower social class in the political process. However, we know little about the underlying mechanisms of this bias or the measures that could compensate for it. Combining cross-national data from a general population survey and an elite-level survey, the present article addresses this knowledge deficit by looking at one potential determinant of working-class underrepresentation: the unequal composition of parliaments. Building on arguments for descriptive representation, I argue that members of the working class experience similar living situations and life chances that form their preferences. Consequently, working-class politicians may be better suited to representing working-class views. The results confirm lower congruence levels between the political elite and working-class citizens. However, class-based preference gaps among politicians are relatively small, and politicians’ social class appears to have a limited impact on compensating for the representational inequality of the working class.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Political Studies}, author = {Hahn, Caroline}, month = may, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2015, WK-REVIEWED}, pages = {527--550}, }
Recent research has revealed a considerable representation gap disadvantaging the lower social class in the political process. However, we know little about the underlying mechanisms of this bias or the measures that could compensate for it. Combining cross-national data from a general population survey and an elite-level survey, the present article addresses this knowledge deficit by looking at one potential determinant of working-class underrepresentation: the unequal composition of parliaments. Building on arguments for descriptive representation, I argue that members of the working class experience similar living situations and life chances that form their preferences. Consequently, working-class politicians may be better suited to representing working-class views. The results confirm lower congruence levels between the political elite and working-class citizens. However, class-based preference gaps among politicians are relatively small, and politicians’ social class appears to have a limited impact on compensating for the representational inequality of the working class.
For women only? Politicians’ attitudes towards men’s role in gender equality representation.
Höhmann, D.
West European Politics,1–27. April 2024.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{hohmann_for_2024, title = {For women only? {Politicians}’ attitudes towards men’s role in gender equality representation}, issn = {0140-2382, 1743-9655}, shorttitle = {For women only?}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2024.2325797}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2024.2325797}, abstract = {The article analyses politicians’ attitudes towards men’s participation in the representation of gender equality interests. Recent studies emphasise the participation of men politicians, since gender equality should be understood as a concern for both women and men in society. Conversely, it is argued that women politicians, who share gender-specific experiences of discrimination with other women, are the primary actors in gender equality representation. This article explores to what extent these viewpoints are shared among politicians in Canada, Portugal, Romania and Switzerland, and analyses the socio-demographic and ideological determinants influencing politicians’ support for an active role of men representatives. Data from the Comparative Candidate Study (2019–2024) show that almost half of the candidates consider gender equality as a field primarily suited to women representatives. Older candidates, as well as those with conservative ideological positions, are more inclined to view women as the primary actors in gender equality representation.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {West European Politics}, author = {Höhmann, Daniel}, month = apr, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COMPONENT-PES, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2019, WK-CHECK}, pages = {1--27}, }
The article analyses politicians’ attitudes towards men’s participation in the representation of gender equality interests. Recent studies emphasise the participation of men politicians, since gender equality should be understood as a concern for both women and men in society. Conversely, it is argued that women politicians, who share gender-specific experiences of discrimination with other women, are the primary actors in gender equality representation. This article explores to what extent these viewpoints are shared among politicians in Canada, Portugal, Romania and Switzerland, and analyses the socio-demographic and ideological determinants influencing politicians’ support for an active role of men representatives. Data from the Comparative Candidate Study (2019–2024) show that almost half of the candidates consider gender equality as a field primarily suited to women representatives. Older candidates, as well as those with conservative ideological positions, are more inclined to view women as the primary actors in gender equality representation.
Party organisation and the party-delegate style of representation.
Close, C.; Legein, T.; and Little, C.
Party Politics, 30(2): 247–259. March 2024.
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@article{close_party_2024, title = {Party organisation and the party-delegate style of representation}, volume = {30}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688221122332}, doi = {10.1177/13540688221122332}, abstract = {Politicians perceive their representative role in a variety of ways: as a delegate of their party, a delegate of voters, or a trustee who exercises their mandate independent of any external principal. Existing research finds that the tendency to adopt a specific style of representation depends on system-level institutions and individuals’ political experience and profile. The influence of the party organisational context remains little understood. This study contributes to filling this gap by examining the effects of parties’ resources and intra-party distribution of power on the prevalence of party delegates among their candidates. Drawing on data from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and the Political Party Database (PPDB) we find that party organisation shapes representation in a way that has not previously been demonstrated: parties with more resources and parties in which members have the final say in candidate selection have a higher proportion of party delegates among their candidates. This demonstrates the centrality of party organisation to representation.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Close, Caroline and Legein, Thomas and Little, Conor}, month = mar, year = {2024}, pages = {247--259}, }
Politicians perceive their representative role in a variety of ways: as a delegate of their party, a delegate of voters, or a trustee who exercises their mandate independent of any external principal. Existing research finds that the tendency to adopt a specific style of representation depends on system-level institutions and individuals’ political experience and profile. The influence of the party organisational context remains little understood. This study contributes to filling this gap by examining the effects of parties’ resources and intra-party distribution of power on the prevalence of party delegates among their candidates. Drawing on data from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and the Political Party Database (PPDB) we find that party organisation shapes representation in a way that has not previously been demonstrated: parties with more resources and parties in which members have the final say in candidate selection have a higher proportion of party delegates among their candidates. This demonstrates the centrality of party organisation to representation.
Running uphill: A comparative analysis of the gender gap in campaign financing.
Sudulich, L.; Trumm, S.; and Makropoulos, I.
European Journal of Political Research,1475–6765.12741. November 2024.
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@article{sudulich_running_2024, title = {Running uphill: {A} comparative analysis of the gender gap in campaign financing}, issn = {0304-4130, 1475-6765}, shorttitle = {Running uphill}, url = {https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12741}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12741}, abstract = {Women are not a demographic minority, but they certainly are a minority in politics. Most legislative bodies across the world are still overwhelmingly male. Female candidates cite lack of resources as one of the main deterrents to run. Using data on candidates encompassing twenty‐eight elections in sixteen countries between 2006 and 2017, we examine the role of electoral institutions, partisanship and candidates’ political profile in mitigating – or aggravating – the gender resource gap. We find that female candidates systematically avail of significantly lower campaign budgets. This is true across different electoral systems and on the left as well as on the right. The gap is larger in size among incumbents. It is also wider in parties that use voluntary quotas and put forward more female candidates. Moreover, the budget composition of male and female candidates varies considerably. Male candidates tend to use higher proportions of their own resources, while female candidates rely on proportionally higher party contributions, that are, however, smaller in size.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, author = {Sudulich, Laura and Trumm, Siim and Makropoulos, Iakovos}, month = nov, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2015, WK-CHECK}, pages = {1475--6765.12741}, }
Women are not a demographic minority, but they certainly are a minority in politics. Most legislative bodies across the world are still overwhelmingly male. Female candidates cite lack of resources as one of the main deterrents to run. Using data on candidates encompassing twenty‐eight elections in sixteen countries between 2006 and 2017, we examine the role of electoral institutions, partisanship and candidates’ political profile in mitigating – or aggravating – the gender resource gap. We find that female candidates systematically avail of significantly lower campaign budgets. This is true across different electoral systems and on the left as well as on the right. The gap is larger in size among incumbents. It is also wider in parties that use voluntary quotas and put forward more female candidates. Moreover, the budget composition of male and female candidates varies considerably. Male candidates tend to use higher proportions of their own resources, while female candidates rely on proportionally higher party contributions, that are, however, smaller in size.
What makes political parties to elect more women? a cross-country comparison.
Pansardi, P.; and Pinto, L.
The Journal of Legislative Studies,1–15. November 2024.
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@article{pansardi_what_2024, title = {What makes political parties to elect more women? a cross-country comparison}, issn = {1357-2334, 1743-9337}, shorttitle = {What makes political parties to elect more women?}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2024.2423576}, doi = {10.1080/13572334.2024.2423576}, abstract = {While women are gaining ground in national parliaments worldwide, the number of female representatives varies greatly between political parties. Since parties themselves can reflect gender biases, they play a key role in shaping women’s representation. Building on the existing literature, this research note examines the interplay between electoral systems, national institutions, and party characteristics to understand these disparities. By analysing data from over 200 parties across 42 legislatures in 24 countries, our results shed light on factors influencing female representation in parliamentary parties and offer valuable insights for promoting gender parity in parliaments.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {The Journal of Legislative Studies}, author = {Pansardi, Pamela and Pinto, Luca}, month = nov, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2015, WK-CHECK}, pages = {1--15}, }
While women are gaining ground in national parliaments worldwide, the number of female representatives varies greatly between political parties. Since parties themselves can reflect gender biases, they play a key role in shaping women’s representation. Building on the existing literature, this research note examines the interplay between electoral systems, national institutions, and party characteristics to understand these disparities. By analysing data from over 200 parties across 42 legislatures in 24 countries, our results shed light on factors influencing female representation in parliamentary parties and offer valuable insights for promoting gender parity in parliaments.
Does it pay to think about the future? Future orientation, ideology, age and vote earning among political candidates.
Lindholm, A.; Rapeli, L.; and Von Schoultz, Å.
International Political Science Review, 45(3): 406–422. June 2024.
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@article{lindholm_does_2024, title = {Does it pay to think about the future? {Future} orientation, ideology, age and vote earning among political candidates}, volume = {45}, issn = {0192-5121, 1460-373X}, shorttitle = {Does it pay to think about the future?}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/01925121231200124}, doi = {10.1177/01925121231200124}, abstract = {Solving societal problems often requires elected politicians to make uncertain investments, which only provide benefits in the future. However, research on future-oriented democratic policymaking has primarily focused on structural explanations and voter behaviour, paying less attention to politicians’ attitudes. In this study, we examine politicians’ future orientation and its potential link to electoral success. Using the latest Finnish data from the Comparative Candidate Survey, combined with voting-advice application data and register-level candidate information, we analyse how candidates’ future orientation correlates with their personal vote shares and ideological positions in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Our findings indicate that future-oriented political candidates, willing to invest in the future despite costs to present wellbeing, tend to be younger, more leftist and green-alternative-liberal. However, the relationship between future orientation and vote-winning is weak, suggesting that office-seeking politicians face neither punishment nor reward for their future-regarding stances.}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {International Political Science Review}, author = {Lindholm, Annika and Rapeli, Lauri and Von Schoultz, Åsa}, month = jun, year = {2024}, pages = {406--422}, }
Solving societal problems often requires elected politicians to make uncertain investments, which only provide benefits in the future. However, research on future-oriented democratic policymaking has primarily focused on structural explanations and voter behaviour, paying less attention to politicians’ attitudes. In this study, we examine politicians’ future orientation and its potential link to electoral success. Using the latest Finnish data from the Comparative Candidate Survey, combined with voting-advice application data and register-level candidate information, we analyse how candidates’ future orientation correlates with their personal vote shares and ideological positions in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Our findings indicate that future-oriented political candidates, willing to invest in the future despite costs to present wellbeing, tend to be younger, more leftist and green-alternative-liberal. However, the relationship between future orientation and vote-winning is weak, suggesting that office-seeking politicians face neither punishment nor reward for their future-regarding stances.
Eidgenössische Wahlen 2023. Wahlteilnahme und Wahlentscheid.
Tresch, A. D.; Rennwald, L.; Lauener, L.; Lutz, G.; Alkoç, N.; Benvenuti, R.; and Mazzoleni, O.
Technical Report FORS, Lausanne, June 2024.
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@techreport{tresch_eidgenossische_2024, address = {Lausanne}, title = {Eidgenössische {Wahlen} 2023. {Wahlteilnahme} und {Wahlentscheid}}, url = {https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_C771AEDDF8FB}, abstract = {Das Wichtigste in Kürze: SVP profitierte von der Sorge um die starke Zuwanderung, SP gewann dank ehemaligen Grünen-Wählenden Der SVP gelang es dank der verbreiteten Sorgen um Zuwanderung und Asyl, ihre Stammwählerschaft von 2019 ausgezeichnet zu mobilisieren und frühere FDP-Wählende von sich zu überzeugen. Die SP profitierte davon, dass mehr als ein Viertel der Wählerschaft der Grünen von 2019 zur SP wechselten. Die SP konnte ihren Wähleranteil insbesondere bei den unter 25-Jährigen auf Kosten der Grünen und Grünliberalen ausbauen. Das Wählerpotenzial der FDP ging weiter zurück, während die neu gegründete Mitte-Partei nicht nur von der Unterstützung früherer CVP- und BDP-Wählender profitierte, sondern auch von Wechselwählenden von links und rechts. Dies zeigt die neuste Studie aus der Schweizer Wahlstudie Selects, die vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds gefördert und von FORS in Lausanne durchgeführt wird. Die SVP und SP gingen nach ihren Verlusten von 2019 als Siegerinnen aus den eidgenössischen Wahlen 2023 hervor, während die ökologischen Parteien ihren Wahlerfolg von 2019 nicht zu bestätigen vermochten und Wähleranteile einbüssten. Die neuste Ausgabe der Schweizer Wahlstudie Selects, die seit 1995 das Wahlverhalten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger bei eidgenössischen Wahlen erforscht, zeigt: Dem rechten Lager gelang es bei den Wahlen 2023 besser als vor vier Jahren, seine Basis zur Wahlteilnahme zu bewegen. Die Wahlbeteiligung von Personen, die sich politisch im rechten Spektrum positionieren, lag bei 55 Prozent, gegenüber 49 Prozent vor vier Jahren. Insbesondere die SVP konnte ihre Stammwählerschaft erfolgreich mobilisieren. Knapp 90 Prozent jener, die 2019 der SVP ihre Stimme gaben und sich 2023 an den Wahlen beteiligten, wählten wiederum SVP. Darüber hinaus überzeugte die SVP auch Teile der FDP- und CVP/BDP-Wählenden von 2019: 14 Prozent der FDP-Wählenden und 7 Prozent der CVP/BDP-Wählenden von 2019, die 2023 an den Wahlen teilnahmen, wählten diesmal SVP. Dabei profitierte die SVP davon, dass sich ihre Kernthemen Zuwanderung und Asyl im Verlauf des Wahlkampfs als wichtigstes Problem für die Wählerschaft etablierten, zuungunsten von Umwelt- und Energiefragen. Verschiebungen im linken Lager Die ökologischen Parteien bekundeten grosse Mühe, ihre Wählerinnen und Wähler von 2019 bei der Stange zu halten. Die Grünen konnten lediglich 54 Prozent ihrer Wählerschaft von 2019 halten, die GLP 61 Prozent. Die Grünen verloren gut einen Viertel ihrer Wählenden von 2019 an die SP, während sich bei der GLP die Abgänge nach links (zu SP und Grünen) und nach rechts (zu Mitte und FDP) in etwa die Waage hielten. Insbesondere die GLP litt unter der rückläufigen Wahlbeteiligung der jungen Wählerschaft. Sie büsste bei den 18- bis 24-Jährigen im Vergleich zu 2019 am meisten Wähleranteile ein (-5 Prozentpunkte). Die SP erfuhr in dieser Altersklasse ihren grössten Zuwachs und stieg zusammen mit der SVP bei den jüngsten Wählenden zur wählerstärksten Partei auf. Der SP gelang es im Vergleich zu 2019 besser, sich bei umweltaffinen Wählerschichten als Alternative zu den Grünen zu etablieren. Unter Personen, die Umwelt- und Energiefragen als wichtigstes politisches Problem erachten, zog die SP mit einem Wähleranteil von knapp einem Viertel mit den Grünen gleich. Ausserdem kam der SP bei der Mobilisierung ihrer Basis zugute, dass mit der schwindenden Kaufkraft und den steigenden Krankenkassenprämien zentrale Themen ihrer Kampagne während des Wahlkampfs an Bedeutung gewannen. Mitte-Rechts im Wandel Die FDP vermochte ihren anhaltenden Abwärtstrend in der Wählergunst auch 2023 nicht zu stoppen. Sie verlor im Verlaufe des Wahlkampfs beträchtliche Wähleranteile an die SVP. Ein Fünftel jener, die im Juli FDP wählen wollten, gaben im Herbst der SVP ihre Stimme. Zudem verliert die FDP seit 2015 kontinuierlich an Wählerpotenzial, d.h. der Anteil Wahlberechtigter, die sich nicht vorstellen können, FDP zu wählen, nimmt zu. Die FDP wird dabei von der neu gegründeten Mitte-Partei bedrängt, die im Vergleich zur ehemaligen CVP für breitere Schichten wählbar geworden ist. Den Grundstein für ihr gutes Abschneiden bei den Wahlen 2023 legten zwar die früheren CVP- und BDP-Wählenden, die zu 82 Prozent Die Mitte wählten. Der Mitte-Partei gelang es aber auch, Wechselwählende aus dem linken und rechten politischen Lager für sich zu gewinnen. Hohe Kampagnenausgaben Die Selects-Kandidierendenbefragung belegt, dass die Kandidierenden in der Schweiz grosse Summen für ihren persönlichen Wahlkampf ausgeben. Basierend auf der Selbstdeklaration der Kandidierenden beliefen sich 2023 die durchschnittlichen Ausgaben pro Kandidatur auf knapp 5500 Franken, wobei ein Viertel der Kandidierenden überhaupt keine finanziellen Mittel in ihren eigenen Wahlkampf steckten. Kandidaten verfügten mit fast 6000 Franken über mehr Mittel als Kandidatinnen mit rund 4300 Franken, während die Wahlkampfausgaben der Gewählten mit durchschnittlich gut 51’000 Franken jene der Nicht-Gewählten (3900 Franken) um ein Vielfaches übertrafen. Das höchste Durchschnittsbudget ergibt sich für Kandidierende der SVP mit rund 12’000 Franken, gefolgt von der FDP mit knapp 11’000 Franken, während Kandidierende der Mitte und der SP über weniger als 5000 Franken verfügten, jene der ökologischen Parteien über weniger als 4000 Franken. Hochgerechnet auf alle Kandidierenden beliefen sich die Wahlkampfausgaben auf insgesamt 32,5 Millionen, wobei ein Fünftel aus Beiträgen der Parteien stammten und je rund 40 Prozent aus Spenden bzw. Eigenmitteln der Kandidierenden. Elite-Basis Konflikt Der Vergleich der politischen Positionen zwischen Kandidierenden und ihre Wählerschaften zeigt, dass die Kandidierenden von SP und Grünen markant weiter links stehen als ihre Wählenden, während sich die Kandidierenden von FDP und SVP rechts von ihren Anhängerschaften positionieren. Die Polarisierung ist damit unter den Kandidierenden stärker als in der Wählerschaft. Bei den Positionen zu verschiedenen Sachfragen zeigen sich vor allem bei sozioökonomischen Themen Diskrepanzen im rechten Lager. Eine Mehrheit der SVP- und FDP-Kandidierenden befürwortet eine Erhöhung des Rentenalters, ihre Wählerschaften lehnen diese hingegen deutlich ab. Umgekehrt spricht sich eine Mehrheit des FDP- und SVP-Elektorats im Gegensatz zu den Kandidierenden für einen Mindestlohn von 4000 Franken für eine Vollzeitstelle aus.}, language = {ger}, urldate = {2024-11-28}, institution = {FORS}, author = {Tresch, Anke Daniela and Rennwald, Line and Lauener, Lukas and Lutz, Georg and Alkoç, Nursel and Benvenuti, Romane and Mazzoleni, Oscar}, month = jun, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COMPONENT-MEDIA, COMPONENT-PANEL, COMPONENT-PES, COUNTRY-1, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-LONGITUDINAL, WK-REVIEWED}, }
Das Wichtigste in Kürze: SVP profitierte von der Sorge um die starke Zuwanderung, SP gewann dank ehemaligen Grünen-Wählenden Der SVP gelang es dank der verbreiteten Sorgen um Zuwanderung und Asyl, ihre Stammwählerschaft von 2019 ausgezeichnet zu mobilisieren und frühere FDP-Wählende von sich zu überzeugen. Die SP profitierte davon, dass mehr als ein Viertel der Wählerschaft der Grünen von 2019 zur SP wechselten. Die SP konnte ihren Wähleranteil insbesondere bei den unter 25-Jährigen auf Kosten der Grünen und Grünliberalen ausbauen. Das Wählerpotenzial der FDP ging weiter zurück, während die neu gegründete Mitte-Partei nicht nur von der Unterstützung früherer CVP- und BDP-Wählender profitierte, sondern auch von Wechselwählenden von links und rechts. Dies zeigt die neuste Studie aus der Schweizer Wahlstudie Selects, die vom Schweizerischen Nationalfonds gefördert und von FORS in Lausanne durchgeführt wird. Die SVP und SP gingen nach ihren Verlusten von 2019 als Siegerinnen aus den eidgenössischen Wahlen 2023 hervor, während die ökologischen Parteien ihren Wahlerfolg von 2019 nicht zu bestätigen vermochten und Wähleranteile einbüssten. Die neuste Ausgabe der Schweizer Wahlstudie Selects, die seit 1995 das Wahlverhalten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger bei eidgenössischen Wahlen erforscht, zeigt: Dem rechten Lager gelang es bei den Wahlen 2023 besser als vor vier Jahren, seine Basis zur Wahlteilnahme zu bewegen. Die Wahlbeteiligung von Personen, die sich politisch im rechten Spektrum positionieren, lag bei 55 Prozent, gegenüber 49 Prozent vor vier Jahren. Insbesondere die SVP konnte ihre Stammwählerschaft erfolgreich mobilisieren. Knapp 90 Prozent jener, die 2019 der SVP ihre Stimme gaben und sich 2023 an den Wahlen beteiligten, wählten wiederum SVP. Darüber hinaus überzeugte die SVP auch Teile der FDP- und CVP/BDP-Wählenden von 2019: 14 Prozent der FDP-Wählenden und 7 Prozent der CVP/BDP-Wählenden von 2019, die 2023 an den Wahlen teilnahmen, wählten diesmal SVP. Dabei profitierte die SVP davon, dass sich ihre Kernthemen Zuwanderung und Asyl im Verlauf des Wahlkampfs als wichtigstes Problem für die Wählerschaft etablierten, zuungunsten von Umwelt- und Energiefragen. Verschiebungen im linken Lager Die ökologischen Parteien bekundeten grosse Mühe, ihre Wählerinnen und Wähler von 2019 bei der Stange zu halten. Die Grünen konnten lediglich 54 Prozent ihrer Wählerschaft von 2019 halten, die GLP 61 Prozent. Die Grünen verloren gut einen Viertel ihrer Wählenden von 2019 an die SP, während sich bei der GLP die Abgänge nach links (zu SP und Grünen) und nach rechts (zu Mitte und FDP) in etwa die Waage hielten. Insbesondere die GLP litt unter der rückläufigen Wahlbeteiligung der jungen Wählerschaft. Sie büsste bei den 18- bis 24-Jährigen im Vergleich zu 2019 am meisten Wähleranteile ein (-5 Prozentpunkte). Die SP erfuhr in dieser Altersklasse ihren grössten Zuwachs und stieg zusammen mit der SVP bei den jüngsten Wählenden zur wählerstärksten Partei auf. Der SP gelang es im Vergleich zu 2019 besser, sich bei umweltaffinen Wählerschichten als Alternative zu den Grünen zu etablieren. Unter Personen, die Umwelt- und Energiefragen als wichtigstes politisches Problem erachten, zog die SP mit einem Wähleranteil von knapp einem Viertel mit den Grünen gleich. Ausserdem kam der SP bei der Mobilisierung ihrer Basis zugute, dass mit der schwindenden Kaufkraft und den steigenden Krankenkassenprämien zentrale Themen ihrer Kampagne während des Wahlkampfs an Bedeutung gewannen. Mitte-Rechts im Wandel Die FDP vermochte ihren anhaltenden Abwärtstrend in der Wählergunst auch 2023 nicht zu stoppen. Sie verlor im Verlaufe des Wahlkampfs beträchtliche Wähleranteile an die SVP. Ein Fünftel jener, die im Juli FDP wählen wollten, gaben im Herbst der SVP ihre Stimme. Zudem verliert die FDP seit 2015 kontinuierlich an Wählerpotenzial, d.h. der Anteil Wahlberechtigter, die sich nicht vorstellen können, FDP zu wählen, nimmt zu. Die FDP wird dabei von der neu gegründeten Mitte-Partei bedrängt, die im Vergleich zur ehemaligen CVP für breitere Schichten wählbar geworden ist. Den Grundstein für ihr gutes Abschneiden bei den Wahlen 2023 legten zwar die früheren CVP- und BDP-Wählenden, die zu 82 Prozent Die Mitte wählten. Der Mitte-Partei gelang es aber auch, Wechselwählende aus dem linken und rechten politischen Lager für sich zu gewinnen. Hohe Kampagnenausgaben Die Selects-Kandidierendenbefragung belegt, dass die Kandidierenden in der Schweiz grosse Summen für ihren persönlichen Wahlkampf ausgeben. Basierend auf der Selbstdeklaration der Kandidierenden beliefen sich 2023 die durchschnittlichen Ausgaben pro Kandidatur auf knapp 5500 Franken, wobei ein Viertel der Kandidierenden überhaupt keine finanziellen Mittel in ihren eigenen Wahlkampf steckten. Kandidaten verfügten mit fast 6000 Franken über mehr Mittel als Kandidatinnen mit rund 4300 Franken, während die Wahlkampfausgaben der Gewählten mit durchschnittlich gut 51’000 Franken jene der Nicht-Gewählten (3900 Franken) um ein Vielfaches übertrafen. Das höchste Durchschnittsbudget ergibt sich für Kandidierende der SVP mit rund 12’000 Franken, gefolgt von der FDP mit knapp 11’000 Franken, während Kandidierende der Mitte und der SP über weniger als 5000 Franken verfügten, jene der ökologischen Parteien über weniger als 4000 Franken. Hochgerechnet auf alle Kandidierenden beliefen sich die Wahlkampfausgaben auf insgesamt 32,5 Millionen, wobei ein Fünftel aus Beiträgen der Parteien stammten und je rund 40 Prozent aus Spenden bzw. Eigenmitteln der Kandidierenden. Elite-Basis Konflikt Der Vergleich der politischen Positionen zwischen Kandidierenden und ihre Wählerschaften zeigt, dass die Kandidierenden von SP und Grünen markant weiter links stehen als ihre Wählenden, während sich die Kandidierenden von FDP und SVP rechts von ihren Anhängerschaften positionieren. Die Polarisierung ist damit unter den Kandidierenden stärker als in der Wählerschaft. Bei den Positionen zu verschiedenen Sachfragen zeigen sich vor allem bei sozioökonomischen Themen Diskrepanzen im rechten Lager. Eine Mehrheit der SVP- und FDP-Kandidierenden befürwortet eine Erhöhung des Rentenalters, ihre Wählerschaften lehnen diese hingegen deutlich ab. Umgekehrt spricht sich eine Mehrheit des FDP- und SVP-Elektorats im Gegensatz zu den Kandidierenden für einen Mindestlohn von 4000 Franken für eine Vollzeitstelle aus.
The radical left and its political communication. An examination of the campaign activities of radical left candidates in sixteen Europe countries.
Katsourides, Y.; and Ioannidis, N.
Party Politics,13540688241238876. March 2024.
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@article{katsourides_radical_2024, title = {The radical left and its political communication. {An} examination of the campaign activities of radical left candidates in sixteen {Europe} countries}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688241238876}, doi = {10.1177/13540688241238876}, abstract = {In this paper we focus on the political communication activities of the candidates of the radical left parties (RLPs), emphasizing their campaign activities during electioneering. We aim to address three key questions. First, we seek to understand what type of political communication activities RLP candidates use. Second, we undertake a comparative analysis, contrasting these activities with those employed by candidates and MPs from other party families in order to identify any notable distinctions. Third, we explore the thematic emphasis of their campaign activities and whether it aligns with the commonly held perception of RLPs as less individualistic, particularly in light of the prevailing trend towards increased personalization in politics. Our data come from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and cover 16 European countries over the years spanning from 2005 to 2017. In sum, the findings present a nuanced perspective and do not conclusively demonstrate a distinctly unique type of candidate of the radical left.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Katsourides, Yiannos and Ioannidis, Nikandros}, month = mar, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2015, WK-CHECK}, pages = {13540688241238876}, }
In this paper we focus on the political communication activities of the candidates of the radical left parties (RLPs), emphasizing their campaign activities during electioneering. We aim to address three key questions. First, we seek to understand what type of political communication activities RLP candidates use. Second, we undertake a comparative analysis, contrasting these activities with those employed by candidates and MPs from other party families in order to identify any notable distinctions. Third, we explore the thematic emphasis of their campaign activities and whether it aligns with the commonly held perception of RLPs as less individualistic, particularly in light of the prevailing trend towards increased personalization in politics. Our data come from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and cover 16 European countries over the years spanning from 2005 to 2017. In sum, the findings present a nuanced perspective and do not conclusively demonstrate a distinctly unique type of candidate of the radical left.
Populism and democratic attitudes: Comparing populist and non-populist candidates’ views on democracy and its alternatives.
Gaio E Silva, J.; and Lisi, M.
Party Politics,13540688241306420. December 2024.
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link
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abstract
@article{gaio_e_silva_populism_2024, title = {Populism and democratic attitudes: {Comparing} populist and non-populist candidates’ views on democracy and its alternatives}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {Populism and democratic attitudes}, url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688241306420}, doi = {10.1177/13540688241306420}, abstract = {The rise of new populist parties has raised concerns for representative political systems and the quality of democracies, by challenging the liberal checks and balances in the name of the ‘general will’. Empirical research has found that populist voters tend to be more dissatisfied with democracy and supportive of direct procedures, while feelings of misrepresentation increase the display of populist attitudes. However, it remains unclear whether this also applies to candidates. This study investigates the differences in democratic attitudes of candidates from populist and non-populist parties, relying on data from the Comparative Candidates Survey. It explores the factors that account for diverging attitudes, particularly regarding party- and individual-level mechanisms. Results suggest that populist candidates tend to reveal lower levels of democratic satisfaction and more negative attitudes towards elections, as well as stronger preferences for direct procedures. These findings have significant implications for both populist studies and the field of political representation.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-12-20}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Gaio E Silva, João and Lisi, Marco}, month = dec, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COUNTRY-COMPARATIVE, SURVEY-CCS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-2007, WAVE-2011, WAVE-2015, WAVE-2019, WK-CHECK}, pages = {13540688241306420}, }
The rise of new populist parties has raised concerns for representative political systems and the quality of democracies, by challenging the liberal checks and balances in the name of the ‘general will’. Empirical research has found that populist voters tend to be more dissatisfied with democracy and supportive of direct procedures, while feelings of misrepresentation increase the display of populist attitudes. However, it remains unclear whether this also applies to candidates. This study investigates the differences in democratic attitudes of candidates from populist and non-populist parties, relying on data from the Comparative Candidates Survey. It explores the factors that account for diverging attitudes, particularly regarding party- and individual-level mechanisms. Results suggest that populist candidates tend to reveal lower levels of democratic satisfaction and more negative attitudes towards elections, as well as stronger preferences for direct procedures. These findings have significant implications for both populist studies and the field of political representation.
Élections fédérales 2023. Participation et choix électoral.
Tresch, A.; Rennwald, L.; Lauener, L.; Lutz, G.; Alkoç, N.; Benvenuti, R.; and Mazzoleni, O.
Technical Report FORS, Lausanne, June 2024.
Paper
link
bibtex
abstract
@techreport{tresch_elections_2024, address = {Lausanne}, title = {Élections fédérales 2023. {Participation} et choix électoral}, url = {https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_B7B5C50B1A49}, abstract = {L’essentiel en bref : L’UDC a profité des préoccupations envers l’immigration, le PS a gagné grâce aux électeur·trice·s qui se sont détourné·e·s des Vert·e·s Tirant profit des préoccupations à l’égard de l’immigration et de l’asile, l’UDC a réussi à mobiliser de manière significative l’électorat qui l’avait déjà soutenu en 2019 et à con-vaincre d’ancien·ne·s électeur·trice·s du PLR. Le PS a, quant à lui, bénéficié de l’afflux de plus d’un quart de l’électorat qui avait voté, en 2019, pour les Vert·e·s. Il a en particu-lier gagné des voix auprès des moins de 25 ans, aux dépens des Vert·e·s et des Vert’ libéraux. Alors que le potentiel électoral du PLR a continué à chuter, le nouveau parti du Centre a pu non seulement profiter du soutien des anciennes électrices et des anciens électeurs du PDC et du PBD, mais aussi de transferts d’électeur·trice·s tant à gauche qu’à droite. C’est ce que montre la nouvelle édition de l’étude électorale suisse Selects, réalisée par FORS à Lausanne avec le soutien du Fonds national suisse. Après leur recul en 2019, l’UDC et le PS sortent vainqueurs des élections fédérales 2023. Les partis écologistes ont été, quant à eux, incapables de confirmer leur succès électoral de 2019. La dernière étude du projet Selects, qui analyse depuis 1995 le comportement électoral des citoyennes et des citoyens lors des élections fédérales, révèle que le camp de droite a su mieux mobiliser sa base et la pousser à voter en 2023 par rapport à l’élection précédente. La participation électorale des personnes se situant sur la droite du spectre politique s’élève en effet à 55 pour cent, contre 49 pour cent en 2019. Et c’est l’UDC qui a excellé en la matière, avec près de 90 pour cent de celles et ceux qui avaient voté UDC en 2019 qui ont à nouveau glissé un bulletin UDC dans l’urne en 2023. L’UDC a, en outre, aussi su séduire une partie de l’électorat qui avait soutenu en 2019 le PLR et le PDC/PBD : 14 pour cent de l’électorat PLR et 7 pour cent de l’électorat PDC/PBD de 2019 a voté UDC en 2023. Le fait que les thèmes centraux de l’UDC tels que l’immigration et l’asile se soient imposés au fil de la campagne comme la principale pré-occupation de l’électorat, au détriment des questions environnementales et énergétiques, a profité au parti. Ça bouge dans le camp de gauche Les partis écologistes ont eu beaucoup de mal à conserver leur électorat de 2019. Les Vert·e·s n’arrivèrent à retenir que 54 pour cent de leur électorat de 2019, le PVL 61 pour cent. Les Vert·e·s ont ainsi vu un bon quart de leurs électrices et électeurs de 2019 les délaisser au profit du PS, alors que du côté du PVL, les désaffections au profit de la gauche (au PS ou chez les Vert·e·s) et de la droite (au Centre ou au PLR) se sont à peu près équilibrées. Le PVL a particulièrement souffert du recul de la participation électorale des jeunes. C’est auprès des 18-24 ans qu’il a perdu le plus de plumes par rapport à 2019 (-5 points de pourcentage). Contrairement au PS qui a connu sa plus forte progres-sion dans cette classe d’âge devenant, avec l’UDC, le premier parti de Suisse en nombre d’électrices et électeurs au sein des jeunes de 18-24 ans. Le PS a aussi mieux réussi qu’en 2019 à se poser en alternative aux Vert·e·s auprès des électeur·trice·s sensibles à l’environnement. Parmi les personnes pour lesquelles la préoccupation politique principale tourne autour des questions environnementales et énergétiques, le PS a pu faire jeu égal avec les Vert·e·s, avec près d’un quart des suffrages. Le fait que les thèmes de la baisse du pouvoir d’achat et de la hausse des primes maladies se soient avérés centraux dans la campagne a en outre aidé le PS à mobiliser sa base. Le centre-droit en mutation Le PLR n’a pas réussi à enrayer sa chute dans les intentions de vote. Il a perdu, au fil de la campagne, une part considérable de son électorat au profit de l’UDC. Un cinquième de celles et ceux qui pensaient voter PLR en juillet ont finalement voté UDC à l’automne. Le PLR n’a, en outre, eu de cesse de perdre en potentiel électoral depuis 2015, ce qui veut dire que le pourcentage de l’électorat qui ne peut envisager de voter pour lui augmente. Le PLR se trouve ainsi concurrencé par le nouveau parti du Centre qui, par rapport à l’ancien PDC, est devenu éligible pour de plus larges franges de la population. Si les ancien·ne·s électeur·trice·s du PDC et du PBD forment, certes, le socle du bon résultat du Centre en 2023, ayant voté à 82 pour cent pour lui, Le Centre a aussi réussi à attirer de nombreuses électrices et de nombreux électeurs de droite et de gauche. Des dépenses de campagne élevées L’enquête Selects auprès des candidat·e·s révèle que les candidat·e·s, en Suisse, dé-pensent des sommes élevées pour leur campagne personnelle. Calculées à partir de l’auto-déclaration des candidat·e·s, les dépenses moyennes par candidat·e s’élevaient, en 2023, à près de 5’500 francs, un quart des candidat·e·s n’ayant rien investi financiè-rement dans leur propre campagne. Les candidats, avec près de 6’000 francs, disposaient de plus de moyens que les candi-dates, avec environ 4300 francs, tandis que les dépenses de campagne des élu·e·s, avec une moyenne d'un peu plus de 51’000 francs, dépassaient de loin celles des non-élu·e·s (3’900 francs). Le budget moyen le plus élevé est celui des candidat·e·s UDC, avec près de 12'000 francs investis, suivi·e·s des PLR avec près de 11'000 francs inves-tis, alors que les candidat·e·s du Centre et du PS purent compter sur moins de 5’000 francs, et celles et ceux des partis écologistes sur moins de 4'000 francs. Par extrapola-tion à l’ensemble des candidat·e·s, le budget de campagne total atteignait les 32,5 mil-lions de francs, un cinquième provenant des contributions des partis et près de 40 pour cent des dons ou des fonds propres des candidat·e·s. Base et élite ne sont pas sur la même longueur d’onde La comparaison des positions politiques des candidat·e·s et de leur électorat montre que les candidat·e·s du PS et des Vert·e·s se positionnent nettement plus à gauche que leur électorat, alors que les candidat·e·s du PLR et de l’UDC sont plus à droite que leurs partisan·e·s. Il existe donc une polarisation plus forte parmi les candidat·e·s qu’au sein de l’électorat. S’agissant des positions sur diverses questions de fond, c’est surtout sur les thèmes socioéconomiques qu’apparaissent des divergences au sein du camp de droite. Une majorité des candidat·e·s UDC et PLR soutiennent, en effet, un relèvement de l’âge de la retraite alors que leur électorat le rejette nettement. A l’inverse, une majori-té de l’électorat PLR et UDC soutient un salaire minimum à 4'000 francs pour un temps plein alors que les candidat·e·s le refusent.}, language = {fre}, urldate = {2024-11-28}, institution = {FORS}, author = {Tresch, Anke and Rennwald, Line and Lauener, Lukas and Lutz, Georg and Alkoç, Nursel and Benvenuti, Romane and Mazzoleni, Oscar}, month = jun, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COMPONENT-MEDIA, COMPONENT-PANEL, COMPONENT-PES, COUNTRY-1, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-LONGITUDINAL, WK-REVIEWED}, }
L’essentiel en bref : L’UDC a profité des préoccupations envers l’immigration, le PS a gagné grâce aux électeur·trice·s qui se sont détourné·e·s des Vert·e·s Tirant profit des préoccupations à l’égard de l’immigration et de l’asile, l’UDC a réussi à mobiliser de manière significative l’électorat qui l’avait déjà soutenu en 2019 et à con-vaincre d’ancien·ne·s électeur·trice·s du PLR. Le PS a, quant à lui, bénéficié de l’afflux de plus d’un quart de l’électorat qui avait voté, en 2019, pour les Vert·e·s. Il a en particu-lier gagné des voix auprès des moins de 25 ans, aux dépens des Vert·e·s et des Vert’ libéraux. Alors que le potentiel électoral du PLR a continué à chuter, le nouveau parti du Centre a pu non seulement profiter du soutien des anciennes électrices et des anciens électeurs du PDC et du PBD, mais aussi de transferts d’électeur·trice·s tant à gauche qu’à droite. C’est ce que montre la nouvelle édition de l’étude électorale suisse Selects, réalisée par FORS à Lausanne avec le soutien du Fonds national suisse. Après leur recul en 2019, l’UDC et le PS sortent vainqueurs des élections fédérales 2023. Les partis écologistes ont été, quant à eux, incapables de confirmer leur succès électoral de 2019. La dernière étude du projet Selects, qui analyse depuis 1995 le comportement électoral des citoyennes et des citoyens lors des élections fédérales, révèle que le camp de droite a su mieux mobiliser sa base et la pousser à voter en 2023 par rapport à l’élection précédente. La participation électorale des personnes se situant sur la droite du spectre politique s’élève en effet à 55 pour cent, contre 49 pour cent en 2019. Et c’est l’UDC qui a excellé en la matière, avec près de 90 pour cent de celles et ceux qui avaient voté UDC en 2019 qui ont à nouveau glissé un bulletin UDC dans l’urne en 2023. L’UDC a, en outre, aussi su séduire une partie de l’électorat qui avait soutenu en 2019 le PLR et le PDC/PBD : 14 pour cent de l’électorat PLR et 7 pour cent de l’électorat PDC/PBD de 2019 a voté UDC en 2023. Le fait que les thèmes centraux de l’UDC tels que l’immigration et l’asile se soient imposés au fil de la campagne comme la principale pré-occupation de l’électorat, au détriment des questions environnementales et énergétiques, a profité au parti. Ça bouge dans le camp de gauche Les partis écologistes ont eu beaucoup de mal à conserver leur électorat de 2019. Les Vert·e·s n’arrivèrent à retenir que 54 pour cent de leur électorat de 2019, le PVL 61 pour cent. Les Vert·e·s ont ainsi vu un bon quart de leurs électrices et électeurs de 2019 les délaisser au profit du PS, alors que du côté du PVL, les désaffections au profit de la gauche (au PS ou chez les Vert·e·s) et de la droite (au Centre ou au PLR) se sont à peu près équilibrées. Le PVL a particulièrement souffert du recul de la participation électorale des jeunes. C’est auprès des 18-24 ans qu’il a perdu le plus de plumes par rapport à 2019 (-5 points de pourcentage). Contrairement au PS qui a connu sa plus forte progres-sion dans cette classe d’âge devenant, avec l’UDC, le premier parti de Suisse en nombre d’électrices et électeurs au sein des jeunes de 18-24 ans. Le PS a aussi mieux réussi qu’en 2019 à se poser en alternative aux Vert·e·s auprès des électeur·trice·s sensibles à l’environnement. Parmi les personnes pour lesquelles la préoccupation politique principale tourne autour des questions environnementales et énergétiques, le PS a pu faire jeu égal avec les Vert·e·s, avec près d’un quart des suffrages. Le fait que les thèmes de la baisse du pouvoir d’achat et de la hausse des primes maladies se soient avérés centraux dans la campagne a en outre aidé le PS à mobiliser sa base. Le centre-droit en mutation Le PLR n’a pas réussi à enrayer sa chute dans les intentions de vote. Il a perdu, au fil de la campagne, une part considérable de son électorat au profit de l’UDC. Un cinquième de celles et ceux qui pensaient voter PLR en juillet ont finalement voté UDC à l’automne. Le PLR n’a, en outre, eu de cesse de perdre en potentiel électoral depuis 2015, ce qui veut dire que le pourcentage de l’électorat qui ne peut envisager de voter pour lui augmente. Le PLR se trouve ainsi concurrencé par le nouveau parti du Centre qui, par rapport à l’ancien PDC, est devenu éligible pour de plus larges franges de la population. Si les ancien·ne·s électeur·trice·s du PDC et du PBD forment, certes, le socle du bon résultat du Centre en 2023, ayant voté à 82 pour cent pour lui, Le Centre a aussi réussi à attirer de nombreuses électrices et de nombreux électeurs de droite et de gauche. Des dépenses de campagne élevées L’enquête Selects auprès des candidat·e·s révèle que les candidat·e·s, en Suisse, dé-pensent des sommes élevées pour leur campagne personnelle. Calculées à partir de l’auto-déclaration des candidat·e·s, les dépenses moyennes par candidat·e s’élevaient, en 2023, à près de 5’500 francs, un quart des candidat·e·s n’ayant rien investi financiè-rement dans leur propre campagne. Les candidats, avec près de 6’000 francs, disposaient de plus de moyens que les candi-dates, avec environ 4300 francs, tandis que les dépenses de campagne des élu·e·s, avec une moyenne d'un peu plus de 51’000 francs, dépassaient de loin celles des non-élu·e·s (3’900 francs). Le budget moyen le plus élevé est celui des candidat·e·s UDC, avec près de 12'000 francs investis, suivi·e·s des PLR avec près de 11'000 francs inves-tis, alors que les candidat·e·s du Centre et du PS purent compter sur moins de 5’000 francs, et celles et ceux des partis écologistes sur moins de 4'000 francs. Par extrapola-tion à l’ensemble des candidat·e·s, le budget de campagne total atteignait les 32,5 mil-lions de francs, un cinquième provenant des contributions des partis et près de 40 pour cent des dons ou des fonds propres des candidat·e·s. Base et élite ne sont pas sur la même longueur d’onde La comparaison des positions politiques des candidat·e·s et de leur électorat montre que les candidat·e·s du PS et des Vert·e·s se positionnent nettement plus à gauche que leur électorat, alors que les candidat·e·s du PLR et de l’UDC sont plus à droite que leurs partisan·e·s. Il existe donc une polarisation plus forte parmi les candidat·e·s qu’au sein de l’électorat. S’agissant des positions sur diverses questions de fond, c’est surtout sur les thèmes socioéconomiques qu’apparaissent des divergences au sein du camp de droite. Une majorité des candidat·e·s UDC et PLR soutiennent, en effet, un relèvement de l’âge de la retraite alors que leur électorat le rejette nettement. A l’inverse, une majori-té de l’électorat PLR et UDC soutient un salaire minimum à 4'000 francs pour un temps plein alors que les candidat·e·s le refusent.
Elezioni federali 2023. Partecipazione e decisione di voto.
Tresch, A.; Rennwald, L.; Lauener, L.; Georg, L.; Alkoç, N.; Benvenuti, R.; and Mazzoleni, O.
Technical Report FORS, Lausanne, June 2024.
Paper
link
bibtex
abstract
@techreport{tresch_elezioni_2024, address = {Lausanne}, title = {Elezioni federali 2023. {Partecipazione} e decisione di voto}, url = {https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_AD2620B51B4E}, abstract = {L’essenziale in breve: l’UDC ha tratto profitto dalla preoccupazione per l’immigrazione, mentre il PS ha vinto riuscendo ad attrarre parte dell’elettorato dei Verdi Facendo leva sui temi dell’immigrazione e dell’asilo, l’UDC è riuscita a mobilitare in modo significativo l’elettorato che l’aveva già votato nel 2019 e a convincere anche parte di chi aveva votato il PLR. Nel 2023, il PS è stato avvantaggiato dall’aver ricevuto i voti di più di un quarto dell’elettorato che nel 2019 aveva sostenuto i Verdi. Il sostegno al PS è au-mentato a svantaggio di Verdi e PVL soprattutto tra i/le votanti nella fascia al di sotto dei 25 anni. L’elettorato potenziale del PLR è invece diminuito ulteriormente, mentre il nuovo partito dell’Alleanza del Centro (AdC) ha beneficiato del sostegno non solo dei/delle vo-tanti del PPD e PBD, ma anche di chi ha abbandonato la sinistra e la destra. Questi sono alcuni dei risultati emersi dal recente studio elettorale svizzero Selects, promosso dal Fondo nazionale svizzero (FNS) e condotto da FORS a Losanna. Dopo la perdita di elettorato del 2019, UDC e PS sono usciti vincenti dalle elezioni federali del 2023, mentre i partiti ecologisti non sono riusciti a riprodurre il successo del 2019 perdendo una parte del loro sostegno elettorale. Dal recente studio Selects, che analizza il comportamento elettorale dei cittadini e delle cittadine in occasione delle elezioni fede-rali dal 1995, si evincono le seguenti conclusioni: nelle elezioni del 2023, la destra è riu-scita a spingere al voto la sua base elettorale con risultati migliori rispetto a quattro anni prima: l’affluenza alle urne di chi si posiziona a destra dello scacchiere politico si è atte-stata al 55\%, contro il 49\% del 2019. In particolare l’UDC è riuscita a mobilitare il suo elettorato storico, infatti è stata scelta nuovamente da quasi il 90\% di chi l’aveva votata nel 2019 e ha espresso un voto nel 2023. L’UDC è riuscita inoltre a convincere anche parte dei sostenitori del PLR e del PPD/PBD: alle ultime elezioni hanno votato UDC il 14\% dell’elettorato che nel 2019 aveva votato il PLR e il 7\% di quello di PPD/PBD. In questo contesto, l’UDC ha tratto profitto dal fatto che i suoi temi centrali, ossia l’immigrazione e l’asilo, nel corso della campagna elettorale, sono diventati importanti anche per un’ampia fetta di elettorato, a scapito dell’ambiente e dell’energia. Spostamenti di voti tra i partiti di sinistra I partiti ecologisti hanno fatto molta fatica a mantenere vivo l’interesse dei loro elettori e delle loro elettrici del 2019. Nel 2023, i Verdi sono riusciti a conservare solo il 54\% del proprio elettorato del 2019, mentre il PVL il 61\%. Circa un quarto dell’elettorato dei Verdi del 2019 ha votato PS nel 2023, mentre per il PVL l’elettorato perso si è suddiviso più o meno a metà tra sinistra (PS e Verdi) e destra (AdC e PLR). In particolare il PVL ha do-vuto fare i conti con una diminuzione di elettori/ttrici giovani: nella fascia tra i 18 e i 24 anni si registra il calo maggiore rispetto al 2019 (-5 punti percentuali). Nella stessa fascia, il PS ha invece raggiunto il suo incremento più cospicuo e, insieme all’UDC, è diventato il partito più sostenuto dall’elettorato svizzero. Rispetto al 2019, il PS è riuscito meglio a consolidarsi come alternativa ai Verdi per l’elettorato attento all’ambiente, infatti tra chi ritiene che il problema principale siano le questioni ambientali ed energetiche, il PS ha eguagliato i Verdi e convinto quasi un quarto della quota di votanti. Inoltre la diminuzione del potere d’acquisto e l’aumento dei premi delle casse malati hanno reso più importanti alcuni temi centrali della sua campagna elettorale, aiutando la mobilitazione in favore del PS. Centro-destra in mutamento Il PLR non è riuscito a fermare l’emorragia di sostegni elettorali. Durante la campagna elettorale ha perso una quota considerevole di elettorato a favore dell’UDC: un quinto di chi voleva votare PLR prima della campagna, in autunno ha dato la sua preferenza all’UDC. Il PLR ha inoltre continuato a perdere elettorato potenziale (la quota di aventi diritto di voto che non immaginano di votare per il partito) dal 2015 e subisce la pressione dell’AdC, il nuovo partito che rispetto al predecessore, il PPD, è considerato eleggibile da fasce più ampie della popolazione. L’AdC ha registrato buoni risultati alle elezioni del 2023, dovuti sicuramente agli elettori e alle elettrici degli ex PPD e PBD, che nell’82\% dei casi hanno votato per il nuovo partito, ma anche alle numerose persone indecise di de-stra e sinistra che è riuscito a convincere. Spese elevate per le campagne elettorali Il sondaggio Selects rivolto ai candidati e alle candidate in Svizzera dimostra le somme elevate spese per le campagne elettorali personali: calcolate sulla base dell'autodichiara-zione dei/delle candidati/e, le spese medie per candidato/a ammontavano, nel 2023, a circa 5’500 franchi, con un quarto dei/delle candidati/e che non ha investito alcuna som-ma nella propria campagna. I candidati maschi, con quasi 6’000 franchi, hanno avuto a disposizione più fondi rispetto alle candidate, che invece hanno potuto contare su circa 4’300 franchi. Le spese legate alla campagna elettorale delle persone elette (in media circa 51'000 franchi), invece, sono nettamente superiori rispetto a quelle delle persone non elette (3’900 franchi). Il budget medio più elevato è quello delle persone candidate per l’UDC, con circa 12’000 franchi, seguito da PLR, con poco meno di 11’000 franchi, AdC e PS con meno di 5’000 franchi, e i partiti ecologisti con meno di 4’000 franchi. Estrapolando i relativi dati per tutti/e i/le candidati/e, le spese per la campagna elettorale ammontano in totale a 32,5 milioni di franchi, dei quali un quinto è stato finanziato dai partiti e circa il 40\% da donazioni o dal patrimonio personale di candidate e candidati. Discrepanza tra classe politica e base elettorale Il confronto tra il posizionamento di chi si candida e quello del relativo elettorato mostra che chi è nelle liste elettorali del PS e dei Verdi è notevolmente più a sinistra dei suoi elettori e delle sue elettrici, mentre i/le candidati/e di PLR e UDC sono più a destra dei sostenitori e sostenitrici del proprio partito. Si riscontra pertanto una polarizzazione mag-giore tra i candidati e le candidate che nell’elettorato. Per quanto riguarda le opinioni relative a diverse tematiche selezionate, si rilevano discrepanze tra questi due gruppi soprattutto a destra e riguardo alle questioni socioeconomiche: la maggioranza dei can-didati e delle candidate di UDC e PLR è a favore dell’aumento dell’età pensionabile, che trova invece chiaramente contrari gli elettori e le elettrici di questi due partiti. Viceversa, la maggioranza dell’elettorato di PLR e UDC è favorevole a un salario minimo di 4’000 franchi per un lavoro a tempo pieno, mentre i/le candidati/e sono contrari/e.}, language = {ita}, urldate = {2024-11-28}, institution = {FORS}, author = {Tresch, Anke and Rennwald, Line and Lauener, Lukas and Georg, Lutz and Alkoç, Nursel and Benvenuti, Romane and Mazzoleni, Oscar}, month = jun, year = {2024}, keywords = {COMPONENT-CANDIDATE, COMPONENT-MEDIA, COMPONENT-PANEL, COMPONENT-PES, COUNTRY-1, SURVEY-SELECTS, TYPE-SUBSTANTIVE, WAVE-LONGITUDINAL, WK-REVIEWED}, }
L’essenziale in breve: l’UDC ha tratto profitto dalla preoccupazione per l’immigrazione, mentre il PS ha vinto riuscendo ad attrarre parte dell’elettorato dei Verdi Facendo leva sui temi dell’immigrazione e dell’asilo, l’UDC è riuscita a mobilitare in modo significativo l’elettorato che l’aveva già votato nel 2019 e a convincere anche parte di chi aveva votato il PLR. Nel 2023, il PS è stato avvantaggiato dall’aver ricevuto i voti di più di un quarto dell’elettorato che nel 2019 aveva sostenuto i Verdi. Il sostegno al PS è au-mentato a svantaggio di Verdi e PVL soprattutto tra i/le votanti nella fascia al di sotto dei 25 anni. L’elettorato potenziale del PLR è invece diminuito ulteriormente, mentre il nuovo partito dell’Alleanza del Centro (AdC) ha beneficiato del sostegno non solo dei/delle vo-tanti del PPD e PBD, ma anche di chi ha abbandonato la sinistra e la destra. Questi sono alcuni dei risultati emersi dal recente studio elettorale svizzero Selects, promosso dal Fondo nazionale svizzero (FNS) e condotto da FORS a Losanna. Dopo la perdita di elettorato del 2019, UDC e PS sono usciti vincenti dalle elezioni federali del 2023, mentre i partiti ecologisti non sono riusciti a riprodurre il successo del 2019 perdendo una parte del loro sostegno elettorale. Dal recente studio Selects, che analizza il comportamento elettorale dei cittadini e delle cittadine in occasione delle elezioni fede-rali dal 1995, si evincono le seguenti conclusioni: nelle elezioni del 2023, la destra è riu-scita a spingere al voto la sua base elettorale con risultati migliori rispetto a quattro anni prima: l’affluenza alle urne di chi si posiziona a destra dello scacchiere politico si è atte-stata al 55%, contro il 49% del 2019. In particolare l’UDC è riuscita a mobilitare il suo elettorato storico, infatti è stata scelta nuovamente da quasi il 90% di chi l’aveva votata nel 2019 e ha espresso un voto nel 2023. L’UDC è riuscita inoltre a convincere anche parte dei sostenitori del PLR e del PPD/PBD: alle ultime elezioni hanno votato UDC il 14% dell’elettorato che nel 2019 aveva votato il PLR e il 7% di quello di PPD/PBD. In questo contesto, l’UDC ha tratto profitto dal fatto che i suoi temi centrali, ossia l’immigrazione e l’asilo, nel corso della campagna elettorale, sono diventati importanti anche per un’ampia fetta di elettorato, a scapito dell’ambiente e dell’energia. Spostamenti di voti tra i partiti di sinistra I partiti ecologisti hanno fatto molta fatica a mantenere vivo l’interesse dei loro elettori e delle loro elettrici del 2019. Nel 2023, i Verdi sono riusciti a conservare solo il 54% del proprio elettorato del 2019, mentre il PVL il 61%. Circa un quarto dell’elettorato dei Verdi del 2019 ha votato PS nel 2023, mentre per il PVL l’elettorato perso si è suddiviso più o meno a metà tra sinistra (PS e Verdi) e destra (AdC e PLR). In particolare il PVL ha do-vuto fare i conti con una diminuzione di elettori/ttrici giovani: nella fascia tra i 18 e i 24 anni si registra il calo maggiore rispetto al 2019 (-5 punti percentuali). Nella stessa fascia, il PS ha invece raggiunto il suo incremento più cospicuo e, insieme all’UDC, è diventato il partito più sostenuto dall’elettorato svizzero. Rispetto al 2019, il PS è riuscito meglio a consolidarsi come alternativa ai Verdi per l’elettorato attento all’ambiente, infatti tra chi ritiene che il problema principale siano le questioni ambientali ed energetiche, il PS ha eguagliato i Verdi e convinto quasi un quarto della quota di votanti. Inoltre la diminuzione del potere d’acquisto e l’aumento dei premi delle casse malati hanno reso più importanti alcuni temi centrali della sua campagna elettorale, aiutando la mobilitazione in favore del PS. Centro-destra in mutamento Il PLR non è riuscito a fermare l’emorragia di sostegni elettorali. Durante la campagna elettorale ha perso una quota considerevole di elettorato a favore dell’UDC: un quinto di chi voleva votare PLR prima della campagna, in autunno ha dato la sua preferenza all’UDC. Il PLR ha inoltre continuato a perdere elettorato potenziale (la quota di aventi diritto di voto che non immaginano di votare per il partito) dal 2015 e subisce la pressione dell’AdC, il nuovo partito che rispetto al predecessore, il PPD, è considerato eleggibile da fasce più ampie della popolazione. L’AdC ha registrato buoni risultati alle elezioni del 2023, dovuti sicuramente agli elettori e alle elettrici degli ex PPD e PBD, che nell’82% dei casi hanno votato per il nuovo partito, ma anche alle numerose persone indecise di de-stra e sinistra che è riuscito a convincere. Spese elevate per le campagne elettorali Il sondaggio Selects rivolto ai candidati e alle candidate in Svizzera dimostra le somme elevate spese per le campagne elettorali personali: calcolate sulla base dell'autodichiara-zione dei/delle candidati/e, le spese medie per candidato/a ammontavano, nel 2023, a circa 5’500 franchi, con un quarto dei/delle candidati/e che non ha investito alcuna som-ma nella propria campagna. I candidati maschi, con quasi 6’000 franchi, hanno avuto a disposizione più fondi rispetto alle candidate, che invece hanno potuto contare su circa 4’300 franchi. Le spese legate alla campagna elettorale delle persone elette (in media circa 51'000 franchi), invece, sono nettamente superiori rispetto a quelle delle persone non elette (3’900 franchi). Il budget medio più elevato è quello delle persone candidate per l’UDC, con circa 12’000 franchi, seguito da PLR, con poco meno di 11’000 franchi, AdC e PS con meno di 5’000 franchi, e i partiti ecologisti con meno di 4’000 franchi. Estrapolando i relativi dati per tutti/e i/le candidati/e, le spese per la campagna elettorale ammontano in totale a 32,5 milioni di franchi, dei quali un quinto è stato finanziato dai partiti e circa il 40% da donazioni o dal patrimonio personale di candidate e candidati. Discrepanza tra classe politica e base elettorale Il confronto tra il posizionamento di chi si candida e quello del relativo elettorato mostra che chi è nelle liste elettorali del PS e dei Verdi è notevolmente più a sinistra dei suoi elettori e delle sue elettrici, mentre i/le candidati/e di PLR e UDC sono più a destra dei sostenitori e sostenitrici del proprio partito. Si riscontra pertanto una polarizzazione mag-giore tra i candidati e le candidate che nell’elettorato. Per quanto riguarda le opinioni relative a diverse tematiche selezionate, si rilevano discrepanze tra questi due gruppi soprattutto a destra e riguardo alle questioni socioeconomiche: la maggioranza dei can-didati e delle candidate di UDC e PLR è a favore dell’aumento dell’età pensionabile, che trova invece chiaramente contrari gli elettori e le elettrici di questi due partiti. Viceversa, la maggioranza dell’elettorato di PLR e UDC è favorevole a un salario minimo di 4’000 franchi per un lavoro a tempo pieno, mentre i/le candidati/e sono contrari/e.
Too young to win? Exploring the sources of age-related electoral disadvantage.
Belschner, J.
Electoral Studies, 88: 102748. April 2024.
Paper
doi
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bibtex
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@article{belschner_too_2024, title = {Too young to win? {Exploring} the sources of age-related electoral disadvantage}, volume = {88}, issn = {0261-3794}, shorttitle = {Too young to win?}, url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000064}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102748}, abstract = {Young people continue to be underrepresented in formal politics. Previous research indicates that being a non-middle-aged candidate negatively affects electoral success. What are the origins of this performance gap? This article explores three potential sources of age-related disadvantage: Party affiliation, individual resources, and direct party and voter support. Drawing on data from 21 OECD countries, I show, first, that many age-related disadvantages take a non-linear shape. Both young and senior candidates run for smaller, poorer, and more marginal parties. They spend significantly less money on their campaigns than middle-aged competitors, and young candidates furthermore lack political experience. Young and senior candidates are placed on lower list positions in party-centred electoral systems and receive fewer preference votes in candidate-centred systems. Thus, both parties and voters fail to effectively counter structural age-disadvantages. This article contributes to our understanding of the shape and origins of age-related electoral disadvantages and illustrates the multifaceted reasons for youth's continued political under-representation.}, urldate = {2024-04-18}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, author = {Belschner, Jana}, month = apr, year = {2024}, keywords = {Age, Candidates, Elections, Political parties, Voters, Youth}, pages = {102748}, }
Young people continue to be underrepresented in formal politics. Previous research indicates that being a non-middle-aged candidate negatively affects electoral success. What are the origins of this performance gap? This article explores three potential sources of age-related disadvantage: Party affiliation, individual resources, and direct party and voter support. Drawing on data from 21 OECD countries, I show, first, that many age-related disadvantages take a non-linear shape. Both young and senior candidates run for smaller, poorer, and more marginal parties. They spend significantly less money on their campaigns than middle-aged competitors, and young candidates furthermore lack political experience. Young and senior candidates are placed on lower list positions in party-centred electoral systems and receive fewer preference votes in candidate-centred systems. Thus, both parties and voters fail to effectively counter structural age-disadvantages. This article contributes to our understanding of the shape and origins of age-related electoral disadvantages and illustrates the multifaceted reasons for youth's continued political under-representation.
2023
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It’s My Party and I’ll Agree if I Want To: Explaining Member Perceptions of Internal Ideological Agreement Through Member, Party, and Country Traits.
Purcell, N. L.
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kansas, United States – Kansas, 2023.
ISBN: 9798381429558 Publication Title: ProQuest Dissertations and Theses 30818920
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abstract
2 downloads
@phdthesis{purcell_its_2023, address = {United States -- Kansas}, type = {Ph.{D}.}, title = {It’s {My} {Party} and {I}’ll {Agree} if {I} {Want} {To}: {Explaining} {Member} {Perceptions} of {Internal} {Ideological} {Agreement} {Through} {Member}, {Party}, and {Country} {Traits}}, url = {https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/s-my-party-i-ll-agree-if-want-explaining-member/docview/2918001881/se-2?accountid=12006}, abstract = {Political party functioning and procedures have long been studied under what is known as the unitary actor assumption – that is, because parliamentary democracies tend to function around the central concept that the party or coalition in government uniformly votes in favor of an agreed upon set of policies and the party or parties out of government votes against them, parties can be safely assumed to be internally “unified.” However, due to a growing body of literature that suggests that issue salience is not as monolithic within parties as may have been previously thought, Steiner and Mader (2017) call for dropping this assumption when studying political party functioning. If this assumption is dropped, the ideas of party unity and intra-party heterogeneity come to the forefront of thinking about how political parties behave internally and allows for party unity to be further deconstructed into three facets: agreement, loyalty, and dissent (Hazan and Itzkovitch-Malka 2020). This project seeks to look in-depth at the agreement facet of what they term “party cohesion” by asking the question: What drives a party member’s ideological agreement with their own party? This project finds that there are influences at each level – member, party, and country – that potentially affect how much ideological disagreement a party member perceives with their party.}, language = {English}, school = {University of Kansas}, author = {Purcell, Nicole L.}, collaborator = {Rohrschneider, Robert}, year = {2023}, note = {ISBN: 9798381429558 Publication Title: ProQuest Dissertations and Theses 30818920}, }
Political party functioning and procedures have long been studied under what is known as the unitary actor assumption – that is, because parliamentary democracies tend to function around the central concept that the party or coalition in government uniformly votes in favor of an agreed upon set of policies and the party or parties out of government votes against them, parties can be safely assumed to be internally “unified.” However, due to a growing body of literature that suggests that issue salience is not as monolithic within parties as may have been previously thought, Steiner and Mader (2017) call for dropping this assumption when studying political party functioning. If this assumption is dropped, the ideas of party unity and intra-party heterogeneity come to the forefront of thinking about how political parties behave internally and allows for party unity to be further deconstructed into three facets: agreement, loyalty, and dissent (Hazan and Itzkovitch-Malka 2020). This project seeks to look in-depth at the agreement facet of what they term “party cohesion” by asking the question: What drives a party member’s ideological agreement with their own party? This project finds that there are influences at each level – member, party, and country – that potentially affect how much ideological disagreement a party member perceives with their party.
Elite party disunity negatively predicts mass partisan-ideological sorting.
Robison, J.
Electoral Studies, 85: 102659. October 2023.
Paper
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@article{robison_elite_2023, title = {Elite party disunity negatively predicts mass partisan-ideological sorting}, volume = {85}, issn = {0261-3794}, url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379423000811}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102659}, abstract = {Political parties often feature salient internal conflicts between elite members over the party's positioning on political issues. We consider the relationship between elite partisan disunity and an important element of mass partisanship: partisan-ideological sorting. We argue that the likelihood of a partisan being sorted on a political issue will decrease as the extent of within-party elite disunity increases because this disunity will make it more difficult for mass partisans to ascertain the dominant position in their party and hence undermine persuasion and switching processes. We test this argument using data from the 2009 European Election Studies and 2005–2012 Comparative Candidate Survey. Ultimately, we find that partisan-ideological sorting is substantially lower when party elites are divided on the issue. However, we find weaker evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism. Our findings raise questions about optimal party strategy.}, urldate = {2024-02-18}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, author = {Robison, Joshua}, month = oct, year = {2023}, keywords = {European politics, Partisan-ideological sorting, Party heterogeneity, Public opinion}, pages = {102659}, }
Political parties often feature salient internal conflicts between elite members over the party's positioning on political issues. We consider the relationship between elite partisan disunity and an important element of mass partisanship: partisan-ideological sorting. We argue that the likelihood of a partisan being sorted on a political issue will decrease as the extent of within-party elite disunity increases because this disunity will make it more difficult for mass partisans to ascertain the dominant position in their party and hence undermine persuasion and switching processes. We test this argument using data from the 2009 European Election Studies and 2005–2012 Comparative Candidate Survey. Ultimately, we find that partisan-ideological sorting is substantially lower when party elites are divided on the issue. However, we find weaker evidence in favor of the proposed mechanism. Our findings raise questions about optimal party strategy.
National Populism and Borders: The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe.
Mazzoleni, O.; Biancalana, C.; Pilotti, A.; Bernhard, L.; Yerly, G.; and Lauener, L.
Edward Elgar Publishing, January 2023.
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@book{mazzoleni_national_2023, title = {National {Populism} and {Borders}: {The} {Politicisation} of {Cross}-border {Mobilisations} in {Europe}}, isbn = {978-1-80220-805-4 978-1-80220-804-7}, shorttitle = {National {Populism} and {Borders}}, url = {https://www.elgaronline.com/view/book/9781802208054/9781802208054.xml}, abstract = {Despite the recent wealth of literature on national populism, research has often overlooked one crucial aspect: the border. This innovative book bridges these key concepts, providing a new theoretical conceptualisation of the interplay between populism, nationalism and territorial borders. In this book, borders are not considered as mere institutional boundaries between nation states; on the contrary, the authors adopt a multi-dimensional view of borders as narratives, issues and territorial spaces of mobilisation. Reconsidering the contemporary politicisation of borders in Western Europe, the authors investigate how national populism deals with territorial borders and the various meanings they embody. Empirical case studies focusing on the Swiss borderlands explore parties’ programmes and discourses, representatives’ attitudes, as well as public opinion and voting behaviour, offering key insights into how political actors and citizens react to trends such as growing transnational flows, globalisation and European integration. This timely book, based on original party sources and surveys, will be an essential resource for students and scholars of political science, political sociology, border studies, European integration, Euroscepticism and Swiss politics. Its context-oriented analysis will also prove beneficial to practitioners and representatives involved in cross-border cooperation.}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing}, author = {Mazzoleni, Oscar and Biancalana, Cecilia and Pilotti, Andrea and Bernhard, Laurent and Yerly, Grégoire and Lauener, Lukas}, month = jan, year = {2023}, doi = {10.4337/9781802208054}, }
Despite the recent wealth of literature on national populism, research has often overlooked one crucial aspect: the border. This innovative book bridges these key concepts, providing a new theoretical conceptualisation of the interplay between populism, nationalism and territorial borders. In this book, borders are not considered as mere institutional boundaries between nation states; on the contrary, the authors adopt a multi-dimensional view of borders as narratives, issues and territorial spaces of mobilisation. Reconsidering the contemporary politicisation of borders in Western Europe, the authors investigate how national populism deals with territorial borders and the various meanings they embody. Empirical case studies focusing on the Swiss borderlands explore parties’ programmes and discourses, representatives’ attitudes, as well as public opinion and voting behaviour, offering key insights into how political actors and citizens react to trends such as growing transnational flows, globalisation and European integration. This timely book, based on original party sources and surveys, will be an essential resource for students and scholars of political science, political sociology, border studies, European integration, Euroscepticism and Swiss politics. Its context-oriented analysis will also prove beneficial to practitioners and representatives involved in cross-border cooperation.
Age Inequalities in Political Representation: A Review Article.
Stockemer, D.; and Sundström, A.
Government and Opposition,1–18. May 2023.
Paper
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abstract
1 download
@article{stockemer_age_2023, title = {Age {Inequalities} in {Political} {Representation}: {A} {Review} {Article}}, issn = {0017-257X, 1477-7053}, shorttitle = {Age {Inequalities} in {Political} {Representation}}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0017257X23000118/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/gov.2023.11}, abstract = {People in political decision-making across the globe tend to be much older than the average voter. As such, parliaments and cabinets are unrepresentative of the larger population. This has consequences: it risks favouring policies geared towards the interests of older cohorts, it might alienate youth from voting and could push parties to appeal (even more) to older voters. In this review, we synthesize the growing literature on youth representation. We do so by: (1) delineating the group of young politicians, (2) discussing why youth ought to be present in politics, (3) empirically depicting the state of youth representation, and (4) illustrating the factors that help or harm youth to enter politics. This synthesis shows the degree to which young people are absent from decision-making bodies across the national, subnational and supra-national levels and attempts to make sense of the reasons why there is such a dearth of youth as candidates and representatives. We conclude by discussing gaps in research and suggesting several avenues for future work.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, author = {Stockemer, Daniel and Sundström, Aksel}, month = may, year = {2023}, pages = {1--18}, }
People in political decision-making across the globe tend to be much older than the average voter. As such, parliaments and cabinets are unrepresentative of the larger population. This has consequences: it risks favouring policies geared towards the interests of older cohorts, it might alienate youth from voting and could push parties to appeal (even more) to older voters. In this review, we synthesize the growing literature on youth representation. We do so by: (1) delineating the group of young politicians, (2) discussing why youth ought to be present in politics, (3) empirically depicting the state of youth representation, and (4) illustrating the factors that help or harm youth to enter politics. This synthesis shows the degree to which young people are absent from decision-making bodies across the national, subnational and supra-national levels and attempts to make sense of the reasons why there is such a dearth of youth as candidates and representatives. We conclude by discussing gaps in research and suggesting several avenues for future work.
Measuring the impact of candidates’ tweets on their electoral results.
Kartsounidou, E.; Papaxanthi, D.; and Andreadis, I.
Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 20(2): 154–168. April 2023.
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1 download
@article{kartsounidou_measuring_2023, title = {Measuring the impact of candidates’ tweets on their electoral results}, volume = {20}, issn = {1933-1681, 1933-169X}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19331681.2022.2069181}, doi = {10.1080/19331681.2022.2069181}, abstract = {As politicians are increasingly using Twitter for campaigning, a question has been raised over its effectiveness in political communication. The aim of this paper is to study the influence of Twitter on candidates’ electoral performance, in the context of the 2019 Greek Parliamentary election. We are particularly interested in candidates’ Twitter activity and visibility. We apply an innovative method of analysis of each candidate’s potential reach, taking into account the followers and the followers of retweeters for each candidate and the number of tweets they were able to see. In this way, we explore whether the visibility of a candidate on Twitter is related to his/her electoral performance. We also control for other factors, such as intra-party competition, previous political experience, candidates’ name recognition, and so on. Findings suggest that among other factors (e.g. previous parliamentary experience), Twitter visibility has a significant positive effect on candidates’ electoral performance, especially when the candidates are already recognizable by the public.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Journal of Information Technology \& Politics}, author = {Kartsounidou, Evangelia and Papaxanthi, Dimitra and Andreadis, Ioannis}, month = apr, year = {2023}, pages = {154--168}, }
As politicians are increasingly using Twitter for campaigning, a question has been raised over its effectiveness in political communication. The aim of this paper is to study the influence of Twitter on candidates’ electoral performance, in the context of the 2019 Greek Parliamentary election. We are particularly interested in candidates’ Twitter activity and visibility. We apply an innovative method of analysis of each candidate’s potential reach, taking into account the followers and the followers of retweeters for each candidate and the number of tweets they were able to see. In this way, we explore whether the visibility of a candidate on Twitter is related to his/her electoral performance. We also control for other factors, such as intra-party competition, previous political experience, candidates’ name recognition, and so on. Findings suggest that among other factors (e.g. previous parliamentary experience), Twitter visibility has a significant positive effect on candidates’ electoral performance, especially when the candidates are already recognizable by the public.
Intra-party heterogeneity and voter perceptions of party positions.
Imre, M.
Electoral Studies, 83: 102623. June 2023.
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@article{imre_intra-party_2023, title = {Intra-party heterogeneity and voter perceptions of party positions}, volume = {83}, issn = {02613794}, url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379423000458}, doi = {10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102623}, abstract = {Do voters correctly perceive left-right positions of political parties? This question received considerable attention in the literature in the past decades. Previous research has shown that most voters have somewhat ‘correct’ perceptions of where parties are located on a left-right dimension, but that both individual and party level factors influence how much those perceptions deviate from the real positions. This paper adds to this literature, relaxing the unitary actor assumption and introducing heterogeneity to the analysis. Using data from elite surveys to measure intraparty preference heterogeneity on two dimensions, I demonstrate that voters' misperceptions of party positions strongly increase the more heterogeneous the positions of party elites are on the economic dimension, but not on the sociocultural dimension, and that the effect size depends on how salient this dimension is for the party. The findings have implications for future research on mass-elite linkages, representation, as well as voting behavior.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Electoral Studies}, author = {Imre, Michael}, month = jun, year = {2023}, pages = {102623}, }
Do voters correctly perceive left-right positions of political parties? This question received considerable attention in the literature in the past decades. Previous research has shown that most voters have somewhat ‘correct’ perceptions of where parties are located on a left-right dimension, but that both individual and party level factors influence how much those perceptions deviate from the real positions. This paper adds to this literature, relaxing the unitary actor assumption and introducing heterogeneity to the analysis. Using data from elite surveys to measure intraparty preference heterogeneity on two dimensions, I demonstrate that voters' misperceptions of party positions strongly increase the more heterogeneous the positions of party elites are on the economic dimension, but not on the sociocultural dimension, and that the effect size depends on how salient this dimension is for the party. The findings have implications for future research on mass-elite linkages, representation, as well as voting behavior.
Responsive to whom? Political advising and elected careers in institutionalized democracies.
Snagovsky, F.; Taflaga, M.; and Kerby, M.
Party Politics, 29(3): 435–447. May 2023.
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@article{snagovsky_responsive_2023, title = {Responsive to whom? {Political} advising and elected careers in institutionalized democracies}, volume = {29}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {Responsive to whom?}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688221079299}, doi = {10.1177/13540688221079299}, abstract = {Political advising is an increasingly important stepping-stone for a parliamentary career in many advanced democracies. Not only does this trend inform our understanding of political parties and careers, there is reason to think former advisors may have distinct attitudes compared to other types of elected officials. Using elite survey data from 42 elections in 21 countries, this study asks whether former political advisers approach representation differently than candidates with other pre-legislative experience. We find that they do. In particular, former advisors are more willing to prioritize their party’s preferences over their constituents’ preferences, and favor their own convictions over their constituents’ priorities. These findings demonstrate that former advisors have a more party-centric approach to representation, consistent with the “loyal partisan” archetype. The results inform our understanding of an increasingly common pathway to elected office as well as the personalization and professionalization of politics and have important implications for representative democracy.}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Snagovsky, Feodor and Taflaga, Marija and Kerby, Matthew}, month = may, year = {2023}, pages = {435--447}, }
Political advising is an increasingly important stepping-stone for a parliamentary career in many advanced democracies. Not only does this trend inform our understanding of political parties and careers, there is reason to think former advisors may have distinct attitudes compared to other types of elected officials. Using elite survey data from 42 elections in 21 countries, this study asks whether former political advisers approach representation differently than candidates with other pre-legislative experience. We find that they do. In particular, former advisors are more willing to prioritize their party’s preferences over their constituents’ preferences, and favor their own convictions over their constituents’ priorities. These findings demonstrate that former advisors have a more party-centric approach to representation, consistent with the “loyal partisan” archetype. The results inform our understanding of an increasingly common pathway to elected office as well as the personalization and professionalization of politics and have important implications for representative democracy.
How Gender Affects Negative and Positive Campaigning.
Coffé, H.; Helimäki, T.; and Von Schoultz, Å.
Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, 44(3): 319–335. July 2023.
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@article{coffe_how_2023, title = {How {Gender} {Affects} {Negative} and {Positive} {Campaigning}}, volume = {44}, issn = {1554-477X, 1554-4788}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1554477X.2023.2180610}, doi = {10.1080/1554477X.2023.2180610}, abstract = {While studies investigating gendered ways of campaigning have primarily focused on negative campaign strategies, we explore the extent to which women and men engage in negative and positive campaigning and how they are combined. Our analyses, relying on the 2019 Finnish Parliamentary Candidates Survey, shows that even in the Finnish context, with comparatively high levels of gender equality in society and politics, distinct gender patterns in campaigning occur. Women candidates report having campaigned more positively than men candidates, while men candidates are more likely to report having campaigned negatively than women candidates. We also find that men are more inclined to incorporate a balanced mixture of positive and negative campaign messages, while women predominantly rely on positive campaigning. Based on our findings, we conclude that women and men still do not compete in politics on equal terms.}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Journal of Women, Politics \& Policy}, author = {Coffé, Hilde and Helimäki, Theodora and Von Schoultz, Åsa}, month = jul, year = {2023}, pages = {319--335}, }
While studies investigating gendered ways of campaigning have primarily focused on negative campaign strategies, we explore the extent to which women and men engage in negative and positive campaigning and how they are combined. Our analyses, relying on the 2019 Finnish Parliamentary Candidates Survey, shows that even in the Finnish context, with comparatively high levels of gender equality in society and politics, distinct gender patterns in campaigning occur. Women candidates report having campaigned more positively than men candidates, while men candidates are more likely to report having campaigned negatively than women candidates. We also find that men are more inclined to incorporate a balanced mixture of positive and negative campaign messages, while women predominantly rely on positive campaigning. Based on our findings, we conclude that women and men still do not compete in politics on equal terms.
Remaining close or drifting apart? Explaining the divergent paths taken by Belgium’s socialist parties in connecting to civil society.
Martin, N.
Acta Politica. March 2023.
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@article{martin_remaining_2023, title = {Remaining close or drifting apart? {Explaining} the divergent paths taken by {Belgium}’s socialist parties in connecting to civil society}, issn = {0001-6810, 1741-1416}, shorttitle = {Remaining close or drifting apart?}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41269-023-00293-8}, doi = {10.1057/s41269-023-00293-8}, abstract = {What explains why parties with shared origins, ideology, and government experience take divergent paths in connecting to civil society? I seek to answer this question with a comparative case study of two socialist parties in Belgium—the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Socialistische Partij Anders (SP.a). I show that far-reaching change in the form of new party competition, the mobilization of new discourses and the fracturing of longstanding policy consensus presented the parties with new challenges. Party elites’ perceptions of the implications of these challenges for party competition, led the two parties to respond to these challenges in very different ways. While the PS retained a socialist vision and proximity to civil allies, the SP.a withdrew from institutions and communities that had connected them to civil society. The study contributes to the literature on relationships between parties and civil society showing how the perspectives of party elites shape key decisions in response to far-reaching change in political contexts, and adds to our understanding of why similar parties exhibit different patterns of connection to civil society organizations.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-01-07}, journal = {Acta Politica}, author = {Martin, Nick}, month = mar, year = {2023}, }
What explains why parties with shared origins, ideology, and government experience take divergent paths in connecting to civil society? I seek to answer this question with a comparative case study of two socialist parties in Belgium—the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Socialistische Partij Anders (SP.a). I show that far-reaching change in the form of new party competition, the mobilization of new discourses and the fracturing of longstanding policy consensus presented the parties with new challenges. Party elites’ perceptions of the implications of these challenges for party competition, led the two parties to respond to these challenges in very different ways. While the PS retained a socialist vision and proximity to civil allies, the SP.a withdrew from institutions and communities that had connected them to civil society. The study contributes to the literature on relationships between parties and civil society showing how the perspectives of party elites shape key decisions in response to far-reaching change in political contexts, and adds to our understanding of why similar parties exhibit different patterns of connection to civil society organizations.
Differential Candidate Selection in Multilevel States: An Analysis of Inclusiveness and Centralisation Levels in Spain.
Pamies, C.
Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 182: 95–118. 2023.
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@article{pamies_differential_2023, title = {Differential {Candidate} {Selection} in {Multilevel} {States}: {An} {Analysis} of {Inclusiveness} and {Centralisation} {Levels} in {Spain}}, volume = {182}, url = {https://reis.cis.es/REIS/jsp/REIS.jsp?opcion=articulo&ktitulo=3179&autor=}, abstract = {This article focuses on inclusivity and centralisation processes in political candidate selection, using survey data with representative samples of nationally, regionally and locally elected politicians in elections between 2015 and 2018. It argues that there are some candidate selection strategies that are based on territorial differences. The analysis shows that while different candidate selection strategies may coexist in multilevel environments, the relationship between territorial decentralisation and candidate selection strategies is not necessarily additive. Party primaries are more commonly used for selecting candidates in regional and local chambers, while the strategies used to select candidates at the national level are as decentralised as they are at the regional level. These results support the importance of analysing territorial levels in order to understand the differences in the use of selection strategies.}, urldate = {2023-03-31}, journal = {Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas}, author = {Pamies, Carles}, year = {2023}, pages = {95--118}, }
This article focuses on inclusivity and centralisation processes in political candidate selection, using survey data with representative samples of nationally, regionally and locally elected politicians in elections between 2015 and 2018. It argues that there are some candidate selection strategies that are based on territorial differences. The analysis shows that while different candidate selection strategies may coexist in multilevel environments, the relationship between territorial decentralisation and candidate selection strategies is not necessarily additive. Party primaries are more commonly used for selecting candidates in regional and local chambers, while the strategies used to select candidates at the national level are as decentralised as they are at the regional level. These results support the importance of analysing territorial levels in order to understand the differences in the use of selection strategies.
What drives elite opinions on European integration? Examining the territorial dimension.
Lauener, L.; and Bernhard, L.
In The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe, of New Horizons in European Politics series, pages 96–118. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023.
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@incollection{lauener_what_2023, series = {New {Horizons} in {European} {Politics} series}, title = {What drives elite opinions on {European} integration? {Examining} the territorial dimension}, isbn = {978 1 80220 804 7}, url = {https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802208054.00014}, abstract = {Scholarly work on Euroscepticism suggests that elite preferences originate from ideology. In this chapter, we additionally focus on the role played by the territorial dimension to explain elite scepticism towards two salient issues: the free movement of persons (FMP) and EU membership. More specifically, we study the explanatory power of the share of cross-border commuters at the municipal level, language region affiliation, and the combined effect of these two factors. The analysis of elite opinions draws on data from the Candidate Survey of the 2019 Swiss Election Study (Selects). We find that Italian-speaking candidates are more Eurosceptic than German-speaking candidates. In addition, the positive effect that the Italian-speaking language region exerts on scepticism towards the FMP is greater the larger the share of cross-border commuters in a candidate's municipality. Finally, candidates from nationalist-populist radical right parties prove to be the fiercest Eurosceptics regarding both the FMP and EU membership.}, language = {English}, booktitle = {The {Politicisation} of {Cross}-border {Mobilisations} in {Europe}}, publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing}, author = {Lauener, Lukas and Bernhard, Laurent}, year = {2023}, pages = {96--118}, }
Scholarly work on Euroscepticism suggests that elite preferences originate from ideology. In this chapter, we additionally focus on the role played by the territorial dimension to explain elite scepticism towards two salient issues: the free movement of persons (FMP) and EU membership. More specifically, we study the explanatory power of the share of cross-border commuters at the municipal level, language region affiliation, and the combined effect of these two factors. The analysis of elite opinions draws on data from the Candidate Survey of the 2019 Swiss Election Study (Selects). We find that Italian-speaking candidates are more Eurosceptic than German-speaking candidates. In addition, the positive effect that the Italian-speaking language region exerts on scepticism towards the FMP is greater the larger the share of cross-border commuters in a candidate's municipality. Finally, candidates from nationalist-populist radical right parties prove to be the fiercest Eurosceptics regarding both the FMP and EU membership.
Politische Position von Parteibasis und Parteiführung der ökologischen Parteien GPS und GLP.
Stadelmann-Steffen, I.; and Ingold, K.
In Die Grünen in der Schweiz. Entwicklung – Wirken – Perspektiven, pages 59–74. Seismo, Zürich und Genf, 2023.
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@incollection{stadelmann-steffen_politische_2023, address = {Zürich und Genf}, title = {Politische {Position} von {Parteibasis} und {Parteiführung} der ökologischen {Parteien} {GPS} und {GLP}}, booktitle = {Die {Grünen} in der {Schweiz}. {Entwicklung} – {Wirken} – {Perspektiven}}, publisher = {Seismo}, author = {Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle and Ingold, Karin}, year = {2023}, pages = {59--74}, }
How stable are ‘left’ and ‘right’? A morphological analysis using open-ended survey responses of parliamentary candidates.
Jankowski, M.; Schneider, S. H; and Tepe, M.
Party Politics, 29(1): 26–39. January 2023.
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@article{jankowski_how_2023, title = {How stable are ‘left’ and ‘right’? {A} morphological analysis using open-ended survey responses of parliamentary candidates}, volume = {29}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {How stable are ‘left’ and ‘right’?}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688211059800}, doi = {10.1177/13540688211059800}, abstract = {The left–right scale is widely used to measure ideological orientation. Relying on Freeden's approach to political ideology as a ‘conceptual morphology’, we argue that the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ may change, but these changes are more likely for peripheral than core concepts. To test this argument, we analyze open-ended questions on the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ included in two waves of surveys of German parliamentary candidates collected before and after the 2015 European migration crisis. The empirical results based on Structural Topic Models show that the candidates’ party affiliation colours the connotations of political concepts. In particular, we find that the core concepts ascribed to the meaning of left and right remained stable, while changes occurred with one peripheral concept in particular, namely, ‘Racism’, which is most often ascribed to the term ‘right’. We conclude that morphological analysis can help better understand the concurrency of change and stability in ideological orientations and provides a fruitful linkage between electoral research and political theory.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Jankowski, Michael and Schneider, Sebastian H and Tepe, Markus}, month = jan, year = {2023}, pages = {26--39}, }
The left–right scale is widely used to measure ideological orientation. Relying on Freeden's approach to political ideology as a ‘conceptual morphology’, we argue that the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ may change, but these changes are more likely for peripheral than core concepts. To test this argument, we analyze open-ended questions on the meaning of ‘left’ and ‘right’ included in two waves of surveys of German parliamentary candidates collected before and after the 2015 European migration crisis. The empirical results based on Structural Topic Models show that the candidates’ party affiliation colours the connotations of political concepts. In particular, we find that the core concepts ascribed to the meaning of left and right remained stable, while changes occurred with one peripheral concept in particular, namely, ‘Racism’, which is most often ascribed to the term ‘right’. We conclude that morphological analysis can help better understand the concurrency of change and stability in ideological orientations and provides a fruitful linkage between electoral research and political theory.
Servants of two (or more) masters: Accounting for the complexity of intraparty candidate selection methods.
Tuttnauer, O.; and Rahat, G.
Party Politics, 29(1): 185–192. January 2023.
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@article{tuttnauer_servants_2023, title = {Servants of two (or more) masters: {Accounting} for the complexity of intraparty candidate selection methods}, volume = {29}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {Servants of two (or more) masters}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688211060658}, doi = {10.1177/13540688211060658}, abstract = {Intraparty candidate selection methods are the drivers of many topics of interest to political scientists. Their operationalization, however, is made complicated because they tend to involve multiple selectorates that differ in their levels of inclusiveness and centralization and that play various roles within the process. This complexity poses a challenge for large- n comparative studies. Drawing on the Political Parties DataBase Round Two to analyze candidate selection methods in 184 parties from 35 democracies, we highlight the inadequacy of the currently available measures to correctly account for this complexity in large- n studies and offer improvements on this front. Specifically, we propose a continuous measure of inclusiveness that better captures the complexity of candidate selection methods and a new measure of complexity to facilitate future analyses into this feature. We recommend that scholars in other cross-national projects consider adopting similar or improved coding strategies in order to better capture these complexities.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Tuttnauer, Or and Rahat, Gideon}, month = jan, year = {2023}, pages = {185--192}, }
Intraparty candidate selection methods are the drivers of many topics of interest to political scientists. Their operationalization, however, is made complicated because they tend to involve multiple selectorates that differ in their levels of inclusiveness and centralization and that play various roles within the process. This complexity poses a challenge for large- n comparative studies. Drawing on the Political Parties DataBase Round Two to analyze candidate selection methods in 184 parties from 35 democracies, we highlight the inadequacy of the currently available measures to correctly account for this complexity in large- n studies and offer improvements on this front. Specifically, we propose a continuous measure of inclusiveness that better captures the complexity of candidate selection methods and a new measure of complexity to facilitate future analyses into this feature. We recommend that scholars in other cross-national projects consider adopting similar or improved coding strategies in order to better capture these complexities.
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Affluence and Congruence: Unequal Representation around the World.
Lupu, N.; and Warner, Z.
The Journal of Politics, 84(1): 276–290. January 2022.
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@article{lupu_affluence_2022, title = {Affluence and {Congruence}: {Unequal} {Representation} around the {World}}, volume = {84}, issn = {0022-3816, 1468-2508}, shorttitle = {Affluence and {Congruence}}, url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/714930}, doi = {10.1086/714930}, abstract = {Do elected representatives reflect the preferences of the citizens they represent? Recent studies from the United States and a number of other democracies have found that legislators tend to represent better the preferences of affluent citizens. However, we still know little about how widespread this bias is. To answer this question, we gathered every publicly available survey of elected representatives in the world and matched it with mass survey data. Our data set consists of 92,000 elite observations and 3.9 million citizen observations spread across 565 country-years, 52 individual countries, and 33 years. Using a variety of methods, we find that around the world, legislators’ preferences are consistently more congruent with those of affluent citizens. However, we also find that this inequality varies substantially by issue domain: while the affluent are better represented on economic issues, the poor seem to be overrepresented on cultural issues.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2024-09-03}, journal = {The Journal of Politics}, author = {Lupu, Noam and Warner, Zach}, month = jan, year = {2022}, pages = {276--290}, }
Do elected representatives reflect the preferences of the citizens they represent? Recent studies from the United States and a number of other democracies have found that legislators tend to represent better the preferences of affluent citizens. However, we still know little about how widespread this bias is. To answer this question, we gathered every publicly available survey of elected representatives in the world and matched it with mass survey data. Our data set consists of 92,000 elite observations and 3.9 million citizen observations spread across 565 country-years, 52 individual countries, and 33 years. Using a variety of methods, we find that around the world, legislators’ preferences are consistently more congruent with those of affluent citizens. However, we also find that this inequality varies substantially by issue domain: while the affluent are better represented on economic issues, the poor seem to be overrepresented on cultural issues.
Staying connected: explaining parties’ enduring connections to civil society.
Martin, N.; de Lange, S. L.; and van der Brug, W.
West European Politics, 45(7): 1385–1406. 2022.
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@article{martin_staying_2022, title = {Staying connected: explaining parties’ enduring connections to civil society}, volume = {45}, issn = {0140-2382, 1743-9655}, shorttitle = {Staying connected}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402382.2021.1986784}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2021.1986784}, abstract = {The connections between political parties and civil society are central to parties’ representative performance. Several explanations exist for cross-party variations in the strength of these connections. However, nobody has compared the explanatory power of rival theories. This article does just that, using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries. It establishes that elites in parties with government experience and a left-wing ideological orientation have the strongest links to civil society. Parties at the far right are the least connected, in particular those that have no governing experience. Contrary to expectations, however, the study shows that, when controlling for party ideology and governing experience, the level of intra-party democracy and key components of party trajectory, such as party origin and strategy, are not significant in explaining the strength of party-society connections.}, language = {en}, number = {7}, urldate = {2021-11-18}, journal = {West European Politics}, author = {Martin, Nick and de Lange, Sarah L. and van der Brug, Wouter}, year = {2022}, pages = {1385--1406}, }
The connections between political parties and civil society are central to parties’ representative performance. Several explanations exist for cross-party variations in the strength of these connections. However, nobody has compared the explanatory power of rival theories. This article does just that, using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries. It establishes that elites in parties with government experience and a left-wing ideological orientation have the strongest links to civil society. Parties at the far right are the least connected, in particular those that have no governing experience. Contrary to expectations, however, the study shows that, when controlling for party ideology and governing experience, the level of intra-party democracy and key components of party trajectory, such as party origin and strategy, are not significant in explaining the strength of party-society connections.
Exploring Congruence on Left/Right and Populism Dimensions.
Kartsounidou, E.; Tsigkou, M.; and Andreadis, Ι.
In Andreadis, I.; Stavrakakis, Y.; and Teperoglou, E., editor(s), Proceedings of the DataPopEU Conference (2022): Populism and Euroscepticism in Perspective, pages 91–121. Sofia PA, Thessaloniki, 2022.
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@incollection{kartsounidou_exploring_2022, address = {Thessaloniki}, title = {Exploring {Congruence} on {Left}/{Right} and {Populism} {Dimensions}}, isbn = {978-960-633-054-4}, url = {https://www.datapopeu.gr/sites/default/files/Chapter5-DataPopEU-Proceedings.pdf}, language = {en}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the {DataPopEU} {Conference} (2022): {Populism} and {Euroscepticism} in {Perspective}}, publisher = {Sofia PA}, author = {Kartsounidou, Evangelia and Tsigkou, Maria and Andreadis, Ιoannis}, editor = {Andreadis, Ioannis and Stavrakakis, Yannis and Teperoglou, Eftichia}, year = {2022}, pages = {91--121}, }
Tailored negativity. Campaign consultants, candidate personality, and attack politics.
Nai, A.; Tresch, A.; and Maier, J.
Swiss Political Science Review, 28(2): 338–360. May 2022.
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@article{nai_tailored_2022, title = {Tailored negativity. {Campaign} consultants, candidate personality, and attack politics}, volume = {28}, issn = {1424-7755, 1662-6370}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/spsr.12525}, doi = {10.1111/spsr.12525}, abstract = {To what extent are negative election campaigns “tailored” to the personality of the candidates? And with what electoral consequences? In this article we tackle these questions by focusing on the 2019 Swiss federal election. We estimate the presence of negativity as a function of the personality profile of competing candidates (Big Five) and the presence of professional consultants. Analyses based on data from a candidate survey (Selects 2019) suggest that campaign consultants are likely to take stock of the character of their candidate, and tailor the content of their campaigns accordingly - more aggressive for more energetic candidates (higher plasticity) and for less stable candidates (lower stability). These results, we argue, support our central claim that the role of consultants is to provide the most adequate campaign for the candidate they are promoting (“tailoring hypothesis”). We fail however to find any convincing evidence that such tailoring is electorally successful.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2022-05-17}, journal = {Swiss Political Science Review}, author = {Nai, Alessandro and Tresch, Anke and Maier, Jürgen}, month = may, year = {2022}, pages = {338--360}, }
To what extent are negative election campaigns “tailored” to the personality of the candidates? And with what electoral consequences? In this article we tackle these questions by focusing on the 2019 Swiss federal election. We estimate the presence of negativity as a function of the personality profile of competing candidates (Big Five) and the presence of professional consultants. Analyses based on data from a candidate survey (Selects 2019) suggest that campaign consultants are likely to take stock of the character of their candidate, and tailor the content of their campaigns accordingly - more aggressive for more energetic candidates (higher plasticity) and for less stable candidates (lower stability). These results, we argue, support our central claim that the role of consultants is to provide the most adequate campaign for the candidate they are promoting (“tailoring hypothesis”). We fail however to find any convincing evidence that such tailoring is electorally successful.
Voter preferences as a source of descriptive (mis)representation by social class.
Wüest, R.; and Pontusson, J.
European Journal of Political Research, 61(2): 398–419. May 2022.
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@article{wuest_voter_2022, title = {Voter preferences as a source of descriptive (mis)representation by social class}, volume = {61}, issn = {0304-4130, 1475-6765}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12511}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12511}, abstract = {This paper presents the results of a conjoint survey experiment in which Swiss citizens were asked to choose among parliamentary candidates with different class profiles determined by occupation, education and income. Existing survey-experimental literature on this topic suggests that respondents are indifferent to the class profiles of candidates or biased against candidates with high-status occupations and high incomes. We find that respondents are biased against upper middle-class candidates as well as routine working-class candidates. While the bias against upper middle-class candidates is primarily a bias among working-class individuals, the bias against routine working-class candidates is most pronounced among middle-class individuals. Our supplementary analysis of observational data confirms the bias against routine working-class candidates, but not the bias against upper middle-class candidates.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2022-12-08}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, author = {Wüest, Reto and Pontusson, Jonas}, month = may, year = {2022}, pages = {398--419}, }
This paper presents the results of a conjoint survey experiment in which Swiss citizens were asked to choose among parliamentary candidates with different class profiles determined by occupation, education and income. Existing survey-experimental literature on this topic suggests that respondents are indifferent to the class profiles of candidates or biased against candidates with high-status occupations and high incomes. We find that respondents are biased against upper middle-class candidates as well as routine working-class candidates. While the bias against upper middle-class candidates is primarily a bias among working-class individuals, the bias against routine working-class candidates is most pronounced among middle-class individuals. Our supplementary analysis of observational data confirms the bias against routine working-class candidates, but not the bias against upper middle-class candidates.
A Clarity Model of District Representation: District Magnitude and Pork Priorities.
Tromborg, M. W.; and Schwindt‐Bayer, L. A.
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 47(1): 37–52. February 2022.
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@article{tromborg_clarity_2022, title = {A {Clarity} {Model} of {District} {Representation}: {District} {Magnitude} and {Pork} {Priorities}}, volume = {47}, issn = {0362-9805, 1939-9162}, shorttitle = {A {Clarity} {Model} of {District} {Representation}}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.12319}, doi = {10.1111/lsq.12319}, abstract = {Carey and Shugart's important personal vote seeking model has long dominated literature on electoral rules and district representation. Empirical support for the model is somewhat mixed, however. We think one reason may be that its applicability depends on the type of district-focused representation. We present an alternative “clarity model,” drawing from Lancaster, that may work better for one specific type of district-targeted representation—pork provision. The clarity model posits district magnitude should be linked to less pork regardless of ballot type because it limits clarity of responsibility for pork outcomes. Legislators not directly responsible for goods and services allocated to the district can still claim credit for them in high magnitude districts. We test this theory with elite survey data on legislators' priorities toward pork provision in 14 Latin American and 10 Western Europe democracies and find empirical support for a clarity theory of pork priorities.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2022-12-08}, journal = {Legislative Studies Quarterly}, author = {Tromborg, Mathias Wessel and Schwindt‐Bayer, Leslie A.}, month = feb, year = {2022}, pages = {37--52}, }
Carey and Shugart's important personal vote seeking model has long dominated literature on electoral rules and district representation. Empirical support for the model is somewhat mixed, however. We think one reason may be that its applicability depends on the type of district-focused representation. We present an alternative “clarity model,” drawing from Lancaster, that may work better for one specific type of district-targeted representation—pork provision. The clarity model posits district magnitude should be linked to less pork regardless of ballot type because it limits clarity of responsibility for pork outcomes. Legislators not directly responsible for goods and services allocated to the district can still claim credit for them in high magnitude districts. We test this theory with elite survey data on legislators' priorities toward pork provision in 14 Latin American and 10 Western Europe democracies and find empirical support for a clarity theory of pork priorities.
Holding on to voters in volatile times: Bonding voters through party links with civil society.
Martin, N.; de Lange, S. L; and van der Brug, W.
Party Politics, 28(2): 354–364. March 2022.
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@article{martin_holding_2022, title = {Holding on to voters in volatile times: {Bonding} voters through party links with civil society}, volume = {28}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {Holding on to voters in volatile times}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068820980304}, doi = {10.1177/1354068820980304}, abstract = {Political parties are increasingly confronted with electoral volatility. However, the support for some parties is more stable than that of others. Although it has been established that parties’ links to civil society stabilised their electorates in the period until the 1980s, it has not yet been investigated whether such links still fulfil this function in our volatile age. In this paper, we argue that traditional party connections, as well as links to modern day civil society organisations, continue to tie voters to parties. Using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries, we establish that parties with stronger links to civil society do indeed have a more stable support base. This relationship holds for parties of the left and right. Our results demonstrate that parties’ societal embeddedness continues to play a role in understanding party competition in the 21st century.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2022-12-08}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Martin, Nick and de Lange, Sarah L and van der Brug, Wouter}, month = mar, year = {2022}, pages = {354--364}, }
Political parties are increasingly confronted with electoral volatility. However, the support for some parties is more stable than that of others. Although it has been established that parties’ links to civil society stabilised their electorates in the period until the 1980s, it has not yet been investigated whether such links still fulfil this function in our volatile age. In this paper, we argue that traditional party connections, as well as links to modern day civil society organisations, continue to tie voters to parties. Using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries, we establish that parties with stronger links to civil society do indeed have a more stable support base. This relationship holds for parties of the left and right. Our results demonstrate that parties’ societal embeddedness continues to play a role in understanding party competition in the 21st century.
The Indirect Effect of Electoral Rules on Citizens’ Satisfaction with Democracy: A Comparative Study.
Papp, Z.
Swiss Political Science Review, 28(1): 1–20. March 2022.
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@article{papp_indirect_2022, title = {The {Indirect} {Effect} of {Electoral} {Rules} on {Citizens}’ {Satisfaction} with {Democracy}: {A} {Comparative} {Study}}, volume = {28}, issn = {1424-7755, 1662-6370}, shorttitle = {The {Indirect} {Effect} of {Electoral} {Rules} on {Citizens}’ {Satisfaction} with {Democracy}}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/spsr.12497}, doi = {10.1111/spsr.12497}, abstract = {The aim of this study is to understand how electoral rules affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The focus is on the extent to which this effect is mediated by the constituency orientation of legislators and the proportionality of election results. The analysis combines data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Candidates Survey and covers 24 elections from 14 European countries. The multilevel SEM suggests two results. On the one hand, what majority and some mixed-member electoral systems gain through increasing constituency orientation, they lose to disproportional election results. On the other hand, open and flexible lists perform better in increasing satisfaction than closed ballots. Importantly, the analysis reveals a winner-loser gap in how constituency representation and proportionality affect democratic satisfaction. Both are more important for the losers of the elections when they evaluate democratic performance.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Swiss Political Science Review}, author = {Papp, Zsófia}, month = mar, year = {2022}, pages = {1--20}, }
The aim of this study is to understand how electoral rules affect citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The focus is on the extent to which this effect is mediated by the constituency orientation of legislators and the proportionality of election results. The analysis combines data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Candidates Survey and covers 24 elections from 14 European countries. The multilevel SEM suggests two results. On the one hand, what majority and some mixed-member electoral systems gain through increasing constituency orientation, they lose to disproportional election results. On the other hand, open and flexible lists perform better in increasing satisfaction than closed ballots. Importantly, the analysis reveals a winner-loser gap in how constituency representation and proportionality affect democratic satisfaction. Both are more important for the losers of the elections when they evaluate democratic performance.
Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion.
Rehmert, J.
Party Politics, 28(6): 1081–1093. November 2022.
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@article{rehmert_party_2022, title = {Party membership, pre-parliamentary socialization and party cohesion}, volume = {28}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688211039088}, doi = {10.1177/13540688211039088}, abstract = {Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings’ implications in light of recent developments in parties’ candidate recruitment.}, language = {en}, number = {6}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Rehmert, Jochen}, month = nov, year = {2022}, pages = {1081--1093}, }
Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings’ implications in light of recent developments in parties’ candidate recruitment.
The impact of ideological positions and personal attributes of candidates in intraparty competition: A study under the Swiss open‐list PR System.
Ortega, C.; Oñate, P.; and Martín, Á. C.
Swiss Political Science Review,spsr.12549. December 2022.
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@article{ortega_impact_2022, title = {The impact of ideological positions and personal attributes of candidates in intraparty competition: {A} study under the {Swiss} open‐list {PR} {System}}, issn = {1424-7755, 1662-6370}, shorttitle = {The impact of ideological positions and personal attributes of candidates in intraparty competition}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/spsr.12549}, doi = {10.1111/spsr.12549}, abstract = {Intraparty preference voting systems offer different incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote, but little is known about how the candidates' policy positions affect their electoral success in intraparty competition. This article analyses the effect of candidates' ideological positions and personal attributes on their preference vote share in the 2015 and 2019 Swiss Lower House elections. We used candidate survey data combined with official election statistics. Our findings demonstrate that the ideological distance between candidates' positions and their party's median position is of minor importance for their electoral success when compared to their personal attributes. However, ideological distance between candidates and their party's median position reduce their preference vote share.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Swiss Political Science Review}, author = {Ortega, Carmen and Oñate, Pablo and Martín, Ángel Cazorla}, month = dec, year = {2022}, pages = {spsr.12549}, }
Intraparty preference voting systems offer different incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote, but little is known about how the candidates' policy positions affect their electoral success in intraparty competition. This article analyses the effect of candidates' ideological positions and personal attributes on their preference vote share in the 2015 and 2019 Swiss Lower House elections. We used candidate survey data combined with official election statistics. Our findings demonstrate that the ideological distance between candidates' positions and their party's median position is of minor importance for their electoral success when compared to their personal attributes. However, ideological distance between candidates and their party's median position reduce their preference vote share.
The personalization of party politics in Western Europe (1985–2016): evidence from an expert survey.
Marino, B.; Martocchia Diodati, N.; and Verzichelli, L.
Acta Politica, 57(3): 571–596. July 2022.
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@article{marino_personalization_2022, title = {The personalization of party politics in {Western} {Europe} (1985–2016): evidence from an expert survey}, volume = {57}, issn = {0001-6810, 1741-1416}, shorttitle = {The personalization of party politics in {Western} {Europe} (1985–2016)}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41269-021-00210-x}, doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00210-x}, abstract = {The personalization of politics has been extensively studied from different angles and in different national contexts. Nonetheless, an easily comparable and longitudinal study of the personalization of politics at both the country and the party levels is still missing. In this article, we fill this gap by presenting data from an expert survey on the personalization of politics for around 110 parties and a series of Western European countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s. The dimensions analyzed concern the impact of the personalization of politics in general elections, and also party leaders' room for maneuver in candidate selection, the definition of the party's policy-making agenda, and party leaders’ intra-party control. Different reliability tests confirm the goodness of the data collected. At the same time, first descriptive analyses show that there has not been a homogenous diffusion of this phenomenon in Western Europe, and diverging personalization trends are present for different groups of countries or different dimensions of this phenomenon.}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Acta Politica}, author = {Marino, Bruno and Martocchia Diodati, Nicola and Verzichelli, Luca}, month = jul, year = {2022}, pages = {571--596}, }
The personalization of politics has been extensively studied from different angles and in different national contexts. Nonetheless, an easily comparable and longitudinal study of the personalization of politics at both the country and the party levels is still missing. In this article, we fill this gap by presenting data from an expert survey on the personalization of politics for around 110 parties and a series of Western European countries from the mid-1980s to the mid-2010s. The dimensions analyzed concern the impact of the personalization of politics in general elections, and also party leaders' room for maneuver in candidate selection, the definition of the party's policy-making agenda, and party leaders’ intra-party control. Different reliability tests confirm the goodness of the data collected. At the same time, first descriptive analyses show that there has not been a homogenous diffusion of this phenomenon in Western Europe, and diverging personalization trends are present for different groups of countries or different dimensions of this phenomenon.
Sell-Outs or Warriors for Change?: A Comparative Look at Conservative Women in Politics in Democracies.
Och, M.; Shames, S.; and Cooperman, R.
Routledge, London, 1 edition, September 2022.
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@book{och_sell-outs_2022, address = {London}, edition = {1}, title = {Sell-{Outs} or {Warriors} for {Change}?: {A} {Comparative} {Look} at {Conservative} {Women} in {Politics} in {Democracies}}, isbn = {978-1-00-332322-8}, shorttitle = {Sell-{Outs} or {Warriors} for {Change}?}, url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003323228}, abstract = {This book addresses the central question of how right-wing women navigate the cross-pressures between gender identity and political ideology. The hope has always been that more women in politics would lead to greater inclusion of women’s voices and interests in decision-making and policy. Yet this is not always the case; some prominent conservative women such as Margaret Thatcher have rejected the feminist label while others such as Angela Merkel have reluctantly accepted it. Republican women in the U.S. Congress have embraced social and economic policies contrary to what many consider to be women’s issues while EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is a staunch supporter of feminist ideas. Other conservative women, such as Marine LePen in France strategically use feminist ideas to justify their conservative stances on immigration. This brings up an interesting yet understudied question: under what circumstances do conservative women become feminist allies and when do they toe the party line? It is this tension between women’s political representation and conservatism that this edited volume explores. The chapters in this book, except for Chapter 3, were originally published as a special issue of Journal of Women, Politics \& Policy.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, publisher = {Routledge}, author = {Och, Malliga and Shames, Shauna and Cooperman, Rosalyn}, month = sep, year = {2022}, }
This book addresses the central question of how right-wing women navigate the cross-pressures between gender identity and political ideology. The hope has always been that more women in politics would lead to greater inclusion of women’s voices and interests in decision-making and policy. Yet this is not always the case; some prominent conservative women such as Margaret Thatcher have rejected the feminist label while others such as Angela Merkel have reluctantly accepted it. Republican women in the U.S. Congress have embraced social and economic policies contrary to what many consider to be women’s issues while EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen is a staunch supporter of feminist ideas. Other conservative women, such as Marine LePen in France strategically use feminist ideas to justify their conservative stances on immigration. This brings up an interesting yet understudied question: under what circumstances do conservative women become feminist allies and when do they toe the party line? It is this tension between women’s political representation and conservatism that this edited volume explores. The chapters in this book, except for Chapter 3, were originally published as a special issue of Journal of Women, Politics & Policy.
Where is the party? Explaining positions on same-sex marriage in Europe among would-be members of parliament.
Siegel, S. N.; Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J.; and Olinger, B. A.
European Journal of Politics and Gender, 5(1): 83–108. February 2022.
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@article{siegel_where_2022, title = {Where is the party? {Explaining} positions on same-sex marriage in {Europe} among would-be members of parliament}, volume = {5}, issn = {2515-1088, 2515-1096}, shorttitle = {Where is the party?}, url = {https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/ejpg/5/1/article-p83.xml}, doi = {10.1332/251510821X16267702086451}, abstract = {The rapid adoption of marriage equality legislation for non-heterosexual individuals in Europe is attributed to many factors, including dramatic shifts in public opinion, the work of transnational activists and changing international norms. Usually, these factors must be filtered through the halls of parliaments where most policy change happens. Given the importance of parliamentarians’ attitudes, it is surprising that we know so little about how attitudes towards same-sex marriage are distributed across political candidates in Europe and what factors shape them. This article fills that gap by using an underutilised dataset on the political preferences of candidates for parliamentary office. We find that beyond attachment to party families, a candidate’s religiosity and practice has a greater effect on a would-be Member of Parliament’s attitudes towards same-sex marriage. The findings suggest that the success of parliamentary action on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights depends not on the partisan composition of the legislature, but rather on the representation of secular candidates.}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {European Journal of Politics and Gender}, author = {Siegel, Scott N. and Turnbull-Dugarte, Stuart J. and Olinger, Brian A.}, month = feb, year = {2022}, pages = {83--108}, }
The rapid adoption of marriage equality legislation for non-heterosexual individuals in Europe is attributed to many factors, including dramatic shifts in public opinion, the work of transnational activists and changing international norms. Usually, these factors must be filtered through the halls of parliaments where most policy change happens. Given the importance of parliamentarians’ attitudes, it is surprising that we know so little about how attitudes towards same-sex marriage are distributed across political candidates in Europe and what factors shape them. This article fills that gap by using an underutilised dataset on the political preferences of candidates for parliamentary office. We find that beyond attachment to party families, a candidate’s religiosity and practice has a greater effect on a would-be Member of Parliament’s attitudes towards same-sex marriage. The findings suggest that the success of parliamentary action on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights depends not on the partisan composition of the legislature, but rather on the representation of secular candidates.
Youth without Representation: The Absence of Young Adults in Parliaments, Cabinets, and Candidacies.
Stockemer, D.; and Sundstrom, A.
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2022.
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@book{stockemer_youth_2022, address = {Ann Arbor, MI}, title = {Youth without {Representation}: {The} {Absence} of {Young} {Adults} in {Parliaments}, {Cabinets}, and {Candidacies}}, isbn = {978-0-472-07517-1}, shorttitle = {Youth without {Representation}}, url = {https://www.fulcrum.org/concern/monographs/1c18dj02x}, abstract = {Officeholders in contemporary parliaments and cabinets are more likely than not to be male, wealthy, middle-aged or older, and from the dominant ethnicity, whereas young adults have an insufficient presence in political office. Young adults—those aged 35 years or under—comprise a mere ten percent of all parliamentarians globally, and three percent of all cabinet members. Compared to their presence in the world’s population, this age group faces an underrepresentation of one to three in parliament and one to ten in cabinet. In this book, Stockemer and Sundström provide a holistic account of youths’ marginalization in legislatures, cabinets, and candidacies for office through a comparative lens. They argue that youths’ underrepresentation in political office constitutes a democratic deficit and provide ample evidence for why they think that youth must be present in politics at much higher rates. They further embed this book within what they label a vicious cycle of political alienation, which involves the declining political sophistication of the young, their waning electoral participation, and their insufficient of representation in office. Empirically, the authors combine a global focus with in-depth studies, discussing the country-level, party-level, and individual-level factors that bar young adults’ entry to positions of political power. This is the first comprehensive book on youth representation and it has relevance for those broadly interested in issues of representation, democracy, inequality, and comparative politics.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, author = {Stockemer, Daniel and Sundstrom, Aksel}, year = {2022}, }
Officeholders in contemporary parliaments and cabinets are more likely than not to be male, wealthy, middle-aged or older, and from the dominant ethnicity, whereas young adults have an insufficient presence in political office. Young adults—those aged 35 years or under—comprise a mere ten percent of all parliamentarians globally, and three percent of all cabinet members. Compared to their presence in the world’s population, this age group faces an underrepresentation of one to three in parliament and one to ten in cabinet. In this book, Stockemer and Sundström provide a holistic account of youths’ marginalization in legislatures, cabinets, and candidacies for office through a comparative lens. They argue that youths’ underrepresentation in political office constitutes a democratic deficit and provide ample evidence for why they think that youth must be present in politics at much higher rates. They further embed this book within what they label a vicious cycle of political alienation, which involves the declining political sophistication of the young, their waning electoral participation, and their insufficient of representation in office. Empirically, the authors combine a global focus with in-depth studies, discussing the country-level, party-level, and individual-level factors that bar young adults’ entry to positions of political power. This is the first comprehensive book on youth representation and it has relevance for those broadly interested in issues of representation, democracy, inequality, and comparative politics.
Styles of Representation in Constituencies in the Homeland and Abroad: The Case of Italy.
Østergaard-Nielsen, E.; and Camatarri, S.
Parliamentary Affairs, 75(1): 195–216. January 2022.
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@article{ostergaard-nielsen_styles_2022, title = {Styles of {Representation} in {Constituencies} in the {Homeland} and {Abroad}: {The} {Case} of {Italy}}, volume = {75}, issn = {0031-2290, 1460-2482}, shorttitle = {Styles of {Representation} in {Constituencies} in the {Homeland} and {Abroad}}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/75/1/195/6010642}, doi = {10.1093/pa/gsaa063}, abstract = {The role orientation of political representatives and candidates is a longstanding concern in studies of democratic representation. The growing trend in countries to allow citizens abroad to candidate in homeland elections from afar provides an interesting opportunity for understanding how international mobility and context influences ideas of representation among these emigrant candidates. In public debates, emigrant candidates are often portrayed as delegates of the emigrant constituencies. However, drawing on the paradigmatic case of Italy and an original data set comprising emigrant candidates, we show that the perceptions of styles of representation abroad are more complex. Systemic differences between electoral districts at home and abroad are relevant for explaining why and how candidates develop a trustee or delegate orientation.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Parliamentary Affairs}, author = {Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva and Camatarri, Stefano}, month = jan, year = {2022}, pages = {195--216}, }
The role orientation of political representatives and candidates is a longstanding concern in studies of democratic representation. The growing trend in countries to allow citizens abroad to candidate in homeland elections from afar provides an interesting opportunity for understanding how international mobility and context influences ideas of representation among these emigrant candidates. In public debates, emigrant candidates are often portrayed as delegates of the emigrant constituencies. However, drawing on the paradigmatic case of Italy and an original data set comprising emigrant candidates, we show that the perceptions of styles of representation abroad are more complex. Systemic differences between electoral districts at home and abroad are relevant for explaining why and how candidates develop a trustee or delegate orientation.
Political Representation Gaps in Europe: Causes and Consequences.
Günther, L.
SSRN Electronic Journal. 2022.
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1 download
@article{gunther_political_2022, title = {Political {Representation} {Gaps} in {Europe}: {Causes} and {Consequences}}, issn = {1556-5068}, shorttitle = {Political {Representation} {Gaps} in {Europe}}, url = {https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4230288}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4230288}, abstract = {Do parliaments in representative democracies represent the policy attitudes of their voters? I examine this question using data on the policy attitudes of 2,074 parliamentarians and 31,461 citizens who are representative of 27 European countries. Parliamentarians are much more culturally liberal than voters in nearly all countries, while they tend to be more market-oriented than voters on economic issues. These attitude differences likely translate into deviations of policymaking from voters' attitudes because most parliamentarians state to decide according to their own attitudes. I verify that the actual decisions of parliamentarians deviate from voter attitudes by comparing voters' and parliamentarians' voting decisions in referendums. Lack of representation is associated with distrust in democratic institutions, vote abstention, and the ideological positioning of populist parties, which fill empty policy space. I show how these results help to understand the characteristics and rise of populism. Finally, I build a formal model to explain why voters elect parliaments who do not represent their attitudes.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal}, author = {Günther, Laurenz}, year = {2022}, }
Do parliaments in representative democracies represent the policy attitudes of their voters? I examine this question using data on the policy attitudes of 2,074 parliamentarians and 31,461 citizens who are representative of 27 European countries. Parliamentarians are much more culturally liberal than voters in nearly all countries, while they tend to be more market-oriented than voters on economic issues. These attitude differences likely translate into deviations of policymaking from voters' attitudes because most parliamentarians state to decide according to their own attitudes. I verify that the actual decisions of parliamentarians deviate from voter attitudes by comparing voters' and parliamentarians' voting decisions in referendums. Lack of representation is associated with distrust in democratic institutions, vote abstention, and the ideological positioning of populist parties, which fill empty policy space. I show how these results help to understand the characteristics and rise of populism. Finally, I build a formal model to explain why voters elect parliaments who do not represent their attitudes.
What Makes a Successful Candidate? Political Experience and Low-Information Cues in Elections.
Portmann, L.
The Journal of Politics, 84(4): 2049–2063. October 2022.
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@article{portmann_what_2022, title = {What {Makes} a {Successful} {Candidate}? {Political} {Experience} and {Low}-{Information} {Cues} in {Elections}}, volume = {84}, issn = {0022-3816, 1468-2508}, shorttitle = {What {Makes} a {Successful} {Candidate}?}, url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/719638}, doi = {10.1086/719638}, abstract = {It is well established that politically experienced candidates are electorally more successful than “novices.” However, methodological challenges have prevented scholars from establishing how much of this is attributable to voters who use political experience as a cue to infer competence. Further, information about political experience may decrease the weight voters place on other, less informative cues. In a natural quasi-experiment, I exploit the condition that—in the 2015 Swiss national elections—information about candidates’ political experience on party ballots varied approximately at random. In line with cue-based accounts, I show that political experience is most of an asset if it is mentioned on the ballot. Contrary to expectations, however, these cues do not crowd out group-membership cues such as those based on a candidate’s migration background. The results from two original candidate choice survey experiments, designed to measure causal processes, further corroborate these findings.}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {The Journal of Politics}, author = {Portmann, Lea}, month = oct, year = {2022}, pages = {2049--2063}, }
It is well established that politically experienced candidates are electorally more successful than “novices.” However, methodological challenges have prevented scholars from establishing how much of this is attributable to voters who use political experience as a cue to infer competence. Further, information about political experience may decrease the weight voters place on other, less informative cues. In a natural quasi-experiment, I exploit the condition that—in the 2015 Swiss national elections—information about candidates’ political experience on party ballots varied approximately at random. In line with cue-based accounts, I show that political experience is most of an asset if it is mentioned on the ballot. Contrary to expectations, however, these cues do not crowd out group-membership cues such as those based on a candidate’s migration background. The results from two original candidate choice survey experiments, designed to measure causal processes, further corroborate these findings.
Unified voters in a divided society: Ideology and regionalism in Belgium.
Medeiros, M.; Gauvin, J.; and Chhim, C.
Regional & Federal Studies, 32(1): 53–71. January 2022.
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@article{medeiros_unified_2022, title = {Unified voters in a divided society: {Ideology} and regionalism in {Belgium}}, volume = {32}, issn = {1359-7566, 1743-9434}, shorttitle = {Unified voters in a divided society}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13597566.2020.1843021}, doi = {10.1080/13597566.2020.1843021}, abstract = {In societies divided along ethnocultural lines, intergroup cooperation can often be a challenging task. This process can be even more complex if political parties and voters are divided along those same social cleavages. This study focuses on the case of Belgium and explores whether divided societies with separate party systems necessarily lead to distinct partisan alignments. Using electoral survey data from the 2014 Belgian federal election, we investigate whether political ideology is stronger than ethnolinguistic group membership in shaping electoral behaviour. The results demonstrate that although Belgian voters are divided along linguistic lines when it comes to preferences about centralization, they remain aligned along party families on social and economic dimensions.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2023-01-09}, journal = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, author = {Medeiros, Mike and Gauvin, Jean-Philippe and Chhim, Chris}, month = jan, year = {2022}, pages = {53--71}, }
In societies divided along ethnocultural lines, intergroup cooperation can often be a challenging task. This process can be even more complex if political parties and voters are divided along those same social cleavages. This study focuses on the case of Belgium and explores whether divided societies with separate party systems necessarily lead to distinct partisan alignments. Using electoral survey data from the 2014 Belgian federal election, we investigate whether political ideology is stronger than ethnolinguistic group membership in shaping electoral behaviour. The results demonstrate that although Belgian voters are divided along linguistic lines when it comes to preferences about centralization, they remain aligned along party families on social and economic dimensions.
Candidate selection and leadership selection in Belgium : despite intraparty reforms, still prisoners of partitocracy?.
Pilet, J.; Vandeleene, A.; and Wauters, B.
In The Winter on democracy : partitocracy in Belgium : liber amicorum Lieven De Winter, pages 95–118. Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain, 2022.
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@incollection{pilet_candidate_2022, address = {Louvain}, title = {Candidate selection and leadership selection in {Belgium} : despite intraparty reforms, still prisoners of partitocracy?}, isbn = {978-2-39061-246-9}, url = {https://www.i6doc.com/html/WYSIWYGfiles/files/103810-PUL-deprez-Winter-C1-INT-C4.pdf#page=98}, language = {English}, booktitle = {The {Winter} on democracy : partitocracy in {Belgium} : liber amicorum {Lieven} {De} {Winter}}, publisher = {Presses Universitaires de Louvain}, author = {Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Vandeleene, Audrey and Wauters, Bram}, year = {2022}, pages = {95--118}, }
Does Class Shape Legislators’ Approach to Inequality and Economic Policy? A Comparative View.
Hemingway, A.
Government and Opposition, 57(1): 84–107. January 2022.
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@article{hemingway_does_2022, title = {Does {Class} {Shape} {Legislators}’ {Approach} to {Inequality} and {Economic} {Policy}? {A} {Comparative} {View}}, volume = {57}, issn = {0017-257X, 1477-7053}, shorttitle = {Does {Class} {Shape} {Legislators}’ {Approach} to {Inequality} and {Economic} {Policy}?}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0017257X20000275/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/gov.2020.27}, abstract = {Do the class backgrounds of legislators shape their views and actions relating to inequality and economic policy? Building on findings about ‘white-collar government’ in the US, this article examines the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and self-reported behaviour in advanced democracies, drawing on survey data from 15 countries including 73 national and subnational parliaments in Europe and Israel. I find that legislators from business backgrounds are more likely to support income inequality and small government, as well as less likely to consult with labour groups, than those from working-class and other backgrounds. These results are buttressed by analysis of an additional cross-national survey of European legislative candidates’ attitudes, which replicates key findings. Given the skewed class makeup of legislatures in advanced democracies, these findings may be relevant to our understanding of widespread economic and political inequalities that are increasingly salient in many countries.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2022-01-12}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, author = {Hemingway, Alexander}, month = jan, year = {2022}, pages = {84--107}, }
Do the class backgrounds of legislators shape their views and actions relating to inequality and economic policy? Building on findings about ‘white-collar government’ in the US, this article examines the relationship between legislators’ class and their attitudes and self-reported behaviour in advanced democracies, drawing on survey data from 15 countries including 73 national and subnational parliaments in Europe and Israel. I find that legislators from business backgrounds are more likely to support income inequality and small government, as well as less likely to consult with labour groups, than those from working-class and other backgrounds. These results are buttressed by analysis of an additional cross-national survey of European legislative candidates’ attitudes, which replicates key findings. Given the skewed class makeup of legislatures in advanced democracies, these findings may be relevant to our understanding of widespread economic and political inequalities that are increasingly salient in many countries.
Hardwired to attack. Candidates’ personality traits and negative campaigning in three European countries.
Nai, A.; Tresch, A.; and Maier, J.
Acta Politica. January 2022.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{nai_hardwired_2022, title = {Hardwired to attack. {Candidates}’ personality traits and negative campaigning in three {European} countries}, issn = {0001-6810, 1741-1416}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41269-021-00222-7}, doi = {10.1057/s41269-021-00222-7}, abstract = {A growing body of studies shows that the reasons for competing candidates to “go negative” on their opponents during elections—that is, attacking their opponents instead of promoting their own programs or ideas stem from strategic considerations. Yet, existing research has, at this stage, failed to assess whether candidates’ personality traits also play a role. In this article, we bridge the gap between existing work in political psychology and political communication and study to what extent the personality traits of competing candidates are linked with their use of negative campaigning strategies. We rely on candidate survey data for recent elections in three countries—Germany (2017), Switzerland (2019), and Finland (2019). The data includes self-reported measures for candidates’ “Big Five” personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness) and the the use of attacks towards their opponents during the campaign. Controlling for the usual suspects driving the use of negative campaigning we show that this latter is associated with low agreeableness and (marginally) with high extraversion and low conscientiousness. The role of personality for the focus of an attack (issue vs. character attacks) is somewhat less clear-cut. All in all, kinder and more stable candidates tend to go less negative; when they do, they tend to stay away from character-based attacks and somehow focus on issues.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2022-01-06}, journal = {Acta Politica}, author = {Nai, Alessandro and Tresch, Anke and Maier, Jürgen}, month = jan, year = {2022}, }
A growing body of studies shows that the reasons for competing candidates to “go negative” on their opponents during elections—that is, attacking their opponents instead of promoting their own programs or ideas stem from strategic considerations. Yet, existing research has, at this stage, failed to assess whether candidates’ personality traits also play a role. In this article, we bridge the gap between existing work in political psychology and political communication and study to what extent the personality traits of competing candidates are linked with their use of negative campaigning strategies. We rely on candidate survey data for recent elections in three countries—Germany (2017), Switzerland (2019), and Finland (2019). The data includes self-reported measures for candidates’ “Big Five” personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness) and the the use of attacks towards their opponents during the campaign. Controlling for the usual suspects driving the use of negative campaigning we show that this latter is associated with low agreeableness and (marginally) with high extraversion and low conscientiousness. The role of personality for the focus of an attack (issue vs. character attacks) is somewhat less clear-cut. All in all, kinder and more stable candidates tend to go less negative; when they do, they tend to stay away from character-based attacks and somehow focus on issues.
2021
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Transnational solidarity among political elites: what determines support for financial redistribution within the EU in times of crisis?.
Reinl, A.; and Giebler, H.
European Political Science Review,1–20. 2021.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@article{reinl_transnational_2021, title = {Transnational solidarity among political elites: what determines support for financial redistribution within the {EU} in times of crisis?}, issn = {1755-7739, 1755-7747}, shorttitle = {Transnational solidarity among political elites}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/transnational-solidarity-among-political-elites-what-determines-support-for-financial-redistribution-within-the-eu-in-times-of-crisis/F7A27B4185506D96251EDD7AD8C2D174#article}, doi = {10.1017/S1755773921000138}, abstract = {As a consequence of the European Economic Crisis, the European Union (EU) has implanted mechanisms to assist fellow member states facing economic difficulties. Despite an increasing academic interest in public preferences for such intra-EU solidarity measures, research has so far largely ignored individual characteristics that could possibly influence politicians’ views. In this paper, we look at politicians’ preferences for transnational solidarity and argue that these preferences depend on attitudes regarding socioeconomic issues as well as attitudes related to the EU. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relationship is moderated by responsibility attribution and the economic situation in a country. Using survey data of about 4000 politicians running for office in nine EU countries, we find that transnational solidarity is more common for socioeconomically left-wing and pro-EU politicians. Yet, attitudinal differences only cease to matter when the beneficiary state is perceived responsible for the crisis and economic problems at home are low.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2021-06-27}, journal = {European Political Science Review}, author = {Reinl, Ann-Kathrin and Giebler, Heiko}, year = {2021}, note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press}, keywords = {European Union, economic crisis, politicians, solidarity}, pages = {1--20}, }
As a consequence of the European Economic Crisis, the European Union (EU) has implanted mechanisms to assist fellow member states facing economic difficulties. Despite an increasing academic interest in public preferences for such intra-EU solidarity measures, research has so far largely ignored individual characteristics that could possibly influence politicians’ views. In this paper, we look at politicians’ preferences for transnational solidarity and argue that these preferences depend on attitudes regarding socioeconomic issues as well as attitudes related to the EU. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relationship is moderated by responsibility attribution and the economic situation in a country. Using survey data of about 4000 politicians running for office in nine EU countries, we find that transnational solidarity is more common for socioeconomically left-wing and pro-EU politicians. Yet, attitudinal differences only cease to matter when the beneficiary state is perceived responsible for the crisis and economic problems at home are low.
In Search of the Americanization: Candidates and Political Campaigns in European General Election.
Sampugnaro, R.; and Montemagno, F.
Journal of Political Marketing, 20(1): 34–49. January 2021.
Paper
doi
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abstract
@article{sampugnaro_search_2021, title = {In {Search} of the {Americanization}: {Candidates} and {Political} {Campaigns} in {European} {General} {Election}}, volume = {20}, issn = {1537-7857, 1537-7865}, shorttitle = {In {Search} of the {Americanization}}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15377857.2020.1869832}, doi = {10.1080/15377857.2020.1869832}, abstract = {The digital platform has deeply changed the electoral campaigns, producing a consequent evolution of political consulting. Social networks have become the mainstream media so that the digital strategist and the big data analysts have achieved a special place in the “war room,” next to the campaign director and the pollster. In 2012, Obama’s election has marked the entrance in the “Fast Politics”: resulting, on one hand, in 24 hours news, a large amount of auto-generated contents produced by the voters through digital media, fragmentation, instantaneous transmission of messages and, on the other hand, a reduction of the attention threshold. Once again, similarly to the past, the evolution of the media (2.0) ends up changing the nature of election campaigns and political consulting request. What happens in Europe? The objective is to carry out a comparative analysis on the professionalization of candidates’ electoral staff. We wanted to verify if the American model has been imported in Europe with special focus on the techniques and the style of election campaigns management. In particular, within a comparative approach among the European states, the study analyzed the usage of political consulting and the degree of “digitalization” during last general elections: an ancillary practice or, on the contrary, a new tool for consensus? The comparative analysis among European states exploited the data provided by Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS 2013) and constructed synthetic indexes on the professionalization and digitization campaigns, conducting a quantitative and qualitative analysis.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2021-10-18}, journal = {Journal of Political Marketing}, author = {Sampugnaro, Rossana and Montemagno, Francesca}, month = jan, year = {2021}, pages = {34--49}, }
The digital platform has deeply changed the electoral campaigns, producing a consequent evolution of political consulting. Social networks have become the mainstream media so that the digital strategist and the big data analysts have achieved a special place in the “war room,” next to the campaign director and the pollster. In 2012, Obama’s election has marked the entrance in the “Fast Politics”: resulting, on one hand, in 24 hours news, a large amount of auto-generated contents produced by the voters through digital media, fragmentation, instantaneous transmission of messages and, on the other hand, a reduction of the attention threshold. Once again, similarly to the past, the evolution of the media (2.0) ends up changing the nature of election campaigns and political consulting request. What happens in Europe? The objective is to carry out a comparative analysis on the professionalization of candidates’ electoral staff. We wanted to verify if the American model has been imported in Europe with special focus on the techniques and the style of election campaigns management. In particular, within a comparative approach among the European states, the study analyzed the usage of political consulting and the degree of “digitalization” during last general elections: an ancillary practice or, on the contrary, a new tool for consensus? The comparative analysis among European states exploited the data provided by Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS 2013) and constructed synthetic indexes on the professionalization and digitization campaigns, conducting a quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Conducting quantitative studies with the participation of political elites: best practices for designing the study and soliciting the participation of political elites.
Vis, B.; and Stolwijk, S.
Quality & Quantity, 55(4): 1281–1317. August 2021.
Paper
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link
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abstract
@article{vis_conducting_2021, title = {Conducting quantitative studies with the participation of political elites: best practices for designing the study and soliciting the participation of political elites}, volume = {55}, issn = {0033-5177, 1573-7845}, shorttitle = {Conducting quantitative studies with the participation of political elites}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11135-020-01052-z}, doi = {10.1007/s11135-020-01052-z}, abstract = {Conducting quantitative research (e.g., surveys, a large number of interviews, experiments) with the participation of political elites is typically challenging. Given that a population of political elites is typically small by definition, a particular challenge is obtaining a sufficiently high number of observations and, thus, a certain response rate. This paper focuses on two questions related to this challenge: (1) What are best practices for designing the study? And (2) what are best practices for soliciting the participation of political elites? To arrive at these best practices, we (a) examine which factors explain the variation in response rates across surveys within and between large-scale, multi-wave survey projects by statistically analyzing a newly compiled dataset of 342 political elite surveys from eight projects, spanning 30 years and 58 countries, (b) integrate the typically scattered findings from the existing literature and (c) discuss results from an original expert survey among researchers with experience with such research (n = 23). By compiling a comprehensive list of best practices, systematically testing some widely held believes about response rates and by providing benchmarks for response rates depending on country, survey mode and elite type, we aim to facilitate future studies where participation of political elites is required. This will contribute to our knowledge and understanding of political elites’ opinions, information processing and decision making and thereby of the functioning of representative democracies.}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2021-10-19}, journal = {Quality \& Quantity}, author = {Vis, Barbara and Stolwijk, Sjoerd}, month = aug, year = {2021}, pages = {1281--1317}, }
Conducting quantitative research (e.g., surveys, a large number of interviews, experiments) with the participation of political elites is typically challenging. Given that a population of political elites is typically small by definition, a particular challenge is obtaining a sufficiently high number of observations and, thus, a certain response rate. This paper focuses on two questions related to this challenge: (1) What are best practices for designing the study? And (2) what are best practices for soliciting the participation of political elites? To arrive at these best practices, we (a) examine which factors explain the variation in response rates across surveys within and between large-scale, multi-wave survey projects by statistically analyzing a newly compiled dataset of 342 political elite surveys from eight projects, spanning 30 years and 58 countries, (b) integrate the typically scattered findings from the existing literature and (c) discuss results from an original expert survey among researchers with experience with such research (n = 23). By compiling a comprehensive list of best practices, systematically testing some widely held believes about response rates and by providing benchmarks for response rates depending on country, survey mode and elite type, we aim to facilitate future studies where participation of political elites is required. This will contribute to our knowledge and understanding of political elites’ opinions, information processing and decision making and thereby of the functioning of representative democracies.
Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort.
Cox, G. W.; Fiva, J. H.; Smith, D. M.; and Sørensen, R. J.
Journal of Public Economics, 200: 104457. August 2021.
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@article{cox_moral_2021, title = {Moral hazard in electoral teams: {List} rank and campaign effort}, volume = {200}, issn = {00472727}, shorttitle = {Moral hazard in electoral teams}, url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0047272721000931}, doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104457}, abstract = {How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2022-02-14}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, author = {Cox, Gary W. and Fiva, Jon H. and Smith, Daniel M. and Sørensen, Rune J.}, month = aug, year = {2021}, pages = {104457}, }
How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.
Candidate nomination rules and party leader strategies.
Tromborg, M. W.
Party Politics, 27(3): 442–452. May 2021.
Paper
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@article{tromborg_candidate_2021, title = {Candidate nomination rules and party leader strategies}, volume = {27}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068819853967}, doi = {10.1177/1354068819853967}, abstract = {Parliamentary party leaders have an electoral incentive to protect the informational value of their party's label by promoting unity, but recent research has shown that parties can also benefit electorally from appealing broadly through a wide distribution of candidate positions on political issues. This article suggests that party leaders with formal candidate nomination powers balance these incentives by nominating new candidates who are more congruent with the party when the distribution of issue positions among the senior candidates is wide, and, conversely, by nominating new candidates who are more divergent from the party when the senior candidate position distribution is narrow. These possibilities are tested with candidate survey data from six parliamentary democracies, and the results show that new party leader nominations are indeed conditional on the senior candidate distribution, but only on issues that are salient to the party’s electoral brand.}, language = {en}, number = {3}, urldate = {2022-01-12}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Tromborg, Mathias Wessel}, month = may, year = {2021}, pages = {442--452}, }
Parliamentary party leaders have an electoral incentive to protect the informational value of their party's label by promoting unity, but recent research has shown that parties can also benefit electorally from appealing broadly through a wide distribution of candidate positions on political issues. This article suggests that party leaders with formal candidate nomination powers balance these incentives by nominating new candidates who are more congruent with the party when the distribution of issue positions among the senior candidates is wide, and, conversely, by nominating new candidates who are more divergent from the party when the senior candidate position distribution is narrow. These possibilities are tested with candidate survey data from six parliamentary democracies, and the results show that new party leader nominations are indeed conditional on the senior candidate distribution, but only on issues that are salient to the party’s electoral brand.
Breakups hurt: Party switching and perceived proximity between politicians and their party.
Ceron, A.; and Volpi, E.
Party Politics, 27(4): 656–666. July 2021.
Paper
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@article{ceron_breakups_2021, title = {Breakups hurt: {Party} switching and perceived proximity between politicians and their party}, volume = {27}, issn = {1354-0688, 1460-3683}, shorttitle = {Breakups hurt}, url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068819880138}, doi = {10.1177/1354068819880138}, abstract = {What are the effects of party defections on the attitudes of politicians who remain loyal to the party? We answer by combining multiple sources of data into a comprehensive novel data set on parliamentary party switching, to estimate how this affects the perceived distance between a politician and his party. Focusing on the theory of cognitive dissonance and the black sheep effect, we hypothesize that politicians perceive themselves closer to their parties when those parties recently suffered defections. The effect should be greater among incumbent politicians as they directly experience divisions, but also among officials dissatisfied with the leadership as their dissonance should be stronger. Statistical analyses of data from two elite surveys, on a sample of 13,256 politicians belonging to 92 parties that ran in 28 elections held between 2005 and 2015 in 14 countries, provide support for our hypotheses and shed light on the consequences of intra-party defections.}, language = {en}, number = {4}, urldate = {2022-01-12}, journal = {Party Politics}, author = {Ceron, Andrea and Volpi, Elisa}, month = jul, year = {2021}, pages = {656--666}, }
What are the effects of party defections on the attitudes of politicians who remain loyal to the party? We answer by combining multiple sources of data into a comprehensive novel data set on parliamentary party switching, to estimate how this affects the perceived distance between a politician and his party. Focusing on the theory of cognitive dissonance and the black sheep effect, we hypothesize that politicians perceive themselves closer to their parties when those parties recently suffered defections. The effect should be greater among incumbent politicians as they directly experience divisions, but also among officials dissatisfied with the leadership as their dissonance should be stronger. Statistical analyses of data from two elite surveys, on a sample of 13,256 politicians belonging to 92 parties that ran in 28 elections held between 2005 and 2015 in 14 countries, provide support for our hypotheses and shed light on the consequences of intra-party defections.
Politicians in Hard Times: Spanish and South European MPs Facing Citizens after the Great Recession.
Coller, X.; and Sánchez-Ferrer, L.,
editors.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
Paper
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@book{coller_politicians_2021, title = {Politicians in {Hard} {Times}: {Spanish} and {South} {European} {MPs} {Facing} {Citizens} after the {Great} {Recession}}, isbn = {978-3-030-70241-0}, shorttitle = {Politicians in {Hard} {Times}}, url = {https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9783030702410}, abstract = {This book analyses the Spanish parliamentary elites in a comparative perspective within southern Europe. What has been the impact of the Great Recession on the configuration of parliaments and the diversity of legislators? Have new parties delivered better representation of citizens in terms of demographics (gender, age, social class), ideology or political attitudes and beliefs? This original research is based on a 2018 survey on members of two national chambers and 17 regional parliaments. Comparing these data with those of a simultaneous survey carried out on Spanish citizens and with data from previous research a decade ago, the book examines the changes that have occurred in representation during the course of the Great Recession and provides evidence of the growing distance between citizens and parliamentary elites. Additionally, using data from the Comparative Candidates Survey, the book compares the ideological congruence between citizens and their representatives in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2021-06-25}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, editor = {Coller, Xavier and Sánchez-Ferrer, Leonardo}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-70242-7}, }
This book analyses the Spanish parliamentary elites in a comparative perspective within southern Europe. What has been the impact of the Great Recession on the configuration of parliaments and the diversity of legislators? Have new parties delivered better representation of citizens in terms of demographics (gender, age, social class), ideology or political attitudes and beliefs? This original research is based on a 2018 survey on members of two national chambers and 17 regional parliaments. Comparing these data with those of a simultaneous survey carried out on Spanish citizens and with data from previous research a decade ago, the book examines the changes that have occurred in representation during the course of the Great Recession and provides evidence of the growing distance between citizens and parliamentary elites. Additionally, using data from the Comparative Candidates Survey, the book compares the ideological congruence between citizens and their representatives in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece.
2020
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Populist Politicians: Populism, Democratic Dissatisfaction and the Perception of Representation. The Case of Greece.
Lewandowsky, M.
In Bukow, S.; and Jun, U., editor(s), Continuity and Change of Party Democracies in Europe, of Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderhefte, pages 253–281. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, 2020.
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@incollection{lewandowsky_populist_2020, address = {Wiesbaden}, series = {Politische {Vierteljahresschrift} {Sonderhefte}}, title = {Populist {Politicians}: {Populism}, {Democratic} {Dissatisfaction} and the {Perception} of {Representation}. {The} {Case} of {Greece}}, isbn = {978-3-658-28988-1}, shorttitle = {Populist {Politicians}}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28988-1_9}, abstract = {This article investigates populism as an attitude of political elites. Based on an extensive discussion of research on populism, it develops a concept that harmonizes the role perceptions of political elites in representative democracies with dissatisfaction as an evaluative and populism as a specific normative orientation towards democracy. Based on candidate data of the 2015 Greek parliamentary election, this contribution offers an empirical analysis of the linkage between dissatisfaction with democracy, role perceptions and populism. Finally, implications for further research are discussed in detail.}, language = {en}, urldate = {2024-02-18}, booktitle = {Continuity and {Change} of {Party} {Democracies} in {Europe}}, publisher = {Springer Fachmedien}, author = {Lewandowsky, Marcel}, editor = {Bukow, Sebastian and Jun, Uwe}, year = {2020}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-658-28988-1_9}, pages = {253--281}, }
This article investigates populism as an attitude of political elites. Based on an extensive discussion of research on populism, it develops a concept that harmonizes the role perceptions of political elites in representative democracies with dissatisfaction as an evaluative and populism as a specific normative orientation towards democracy. Based on candidate data of the 2015 Greek parliamentary election, this contribution offers an empirical analysis of the linkage between dissatisfaction with democracy, role perceptions and populism. Finally, implications for further research are discussed in detail.
Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections.
Cox, G. W.; Fiva, J. H.; and Smith, D. M.
Political Analysis, 28(2): 168–185. April 2020.
Paper
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@article{cox_measuring_2020, title = {Measuring the {Competitiveness} of {Elections}}, volume = {28}, issn = {1047-1987, 1476-4989}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1047198719000287/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/pan.2019.28}, abstract = {The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2022-02-14}, journal = {Political Analysis}, author = {Cox, Gary W. and Fiva, Jon H. and Smith, Daniel M.}, month = apr, year = {2020}, pages = {168--185}, }
The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).
Parliamentary Candidates Between Voters and Parties: A Comparative Perspective.
De Winter, L.; Karlsen, R.; and Schmitt, H.,
editors.
Routledge, November 2020.
Paper
link
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abstract
@book{de_winter_parliamentary_2020, title = {Parliamentary {Candidates} {Between} {Voters} and {Parties}: {A} {Comparative} {Perspective}}, url = {https://www.routledge.com/Parliamentary-Candidates-Between-Voters-and-Parties-A-Comparative-Perspective/Winter-Karlsen-Schmitt/p/book/9780367248512}, abstract = {This book offers the first comprehensive, comparative and coherent perspective on parliamentary candidates in contemporary representative democracy. Based on the unique database of the ‘Comparative Candidate Survey' project which interrogated parliamentary candidates in more than 30 countries, it fills a significant lacuna by focusing on the thousands of ordinary candidates that participate in national elections. It examines who the candidates are in terms of their socio-demographic background and political career patterns, how they were selected by their parties, what their policy preference are and whether these are congruent to those held by their voters, who they seek to represent and how they intend to do so once elected, and what their visions are on representative democracy and party government. Last but not least, it investigates how they go about reaching out to their potential voters during the election campaign. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political parties and party politics, political elites, political communication, political participation, elections, theories of democracy and representation, legislative studies, voting behaviour and more broadly to European politics, as well as to political and policy professionals throughout Europe.}, language = {en}, publisher = {Routledge}, editor = {De Winter, Lieven and Karlsen, Rune and Schmitt, Hermann}, month = nov, year = {2020}, }
This book offers the first comprehensive, comparative and coherent perspective on parliamentary candidates in contemporary representative democracy. Based on the unique database of the ‘Comparative Candidate Survey' project which interrogated parliamentary candidates in more than 30 countries, it fills a significant lacuna by focusing on the thousands of ordinary candidates that participate in national elections. It examines who the candidates are in terms of their socio-demographic background and political career patterns, how they were selected by their parties, what their policy preference are and whether these are congruent to those held by their voters, who they seek to represent and how they intend to do so once elected, and what their visions are on representative democracy and party government. Last but not least, it investigates how they go about reaching out to their potential voters during the election campaign. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political parties and party politics, political elites, political communication, political participation, elections, theories of democracy and representation, legislative studies, voting behaviour and more broadly to European politics, as well as to political and policy professionals throughout Europe.
Methodological Challenges in the Study of Political Elites.
Freire, A.; Coller, X.; Andreadis, I.; Jaime, A. M.; Serra da Silva, S.; and Kartsounidou, E.
In Freire, A.; Barragán, M.; Coller, X.; Lisi, M.; and Tsatsanis, E., editor(s), Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America Crisis or Continuing Transformation following the Great Recession?. Routledge, London, 2020.
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@incollection{freire_methodological_2020, address = {London}, title = {Methodological {Challenges} in the {Study} of {Political} {Elites}}, isbn = {978-0-367-02294-5}, url = {https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/methodological-challenges-study-political-elites-andr%C3%A9-freire-xavier-coller-ioannis-andreadis-antonio-jaime-sofia-serra-silva-evangelia-kartsounidou/e/10.4324/9780429400414-7}, abstract = {This chapter analyses some of the most important methodological and technical-methodological challenges social scientists face when researching political elites, especially when adopting the positional method. They usually have to choose between analysing the whole population or just a sample of it. Although the choice will be determined by the nature of the research, both options pose challenges for researchers, especially when using web-based surveys. Moreover, the technical-methodological choice of method for data collection when using surveys (mode of survey: face-to-face, mail/self-administered or web-survey) also has fundamental consequences – in the financial and logistic fields and in terms of response rates and data quality. Based on the experience of researchers in Greece, Portugal and Spain, this chapter offers an overview of the more important elite surveys (candidates and/or MPs) fielded in the three Southern European countries under scrutiny and offers also some suggestions on how to improve the data collection and management process in studies targeting the whole population or a sample of MPs and/or candidates.}, booktitle = {Political {Representation} in {Southern} {Europe} and {Latin} {America} {Crisis} or {Continuing} {Transformation} following the {Great} {Recession}?}, publisher = {Routledge}, author = {Freire, André and Coller, Xavier and Andreadis, Ioannis and Jaime, Antonio M. and Serra da Silva, Sofia and Kartsounidou, Evangelia}, editor = {Freire, André and Barragán, Mélany and Coller, Xavier and Lisi, Marco and Tsatsanis, Emmanouil}, year = {2020}, note = {ECC: 0000000}, }
This chapter analyses some of the most important methodological and technical-methodological challenges social scientists face when researching political elites, especially when adopting the positional method. They usually have to choose between analysing the whole population or just a sample of it. Although the choice will be determined by the nature of the research, both options pose challenges for researchers, especially when using web-based surveys. Moreover, the technical-methodological choice of method for data collection when using surveys (mode of survey: face-to-face, mail/self-administered or web-survey) also has fundamental consequences – in the financial and logistic fields and in terms of response rates and data quality. Based on the experience of researchers in Greece, Portugal and Spain, this chapter offers an overview of the more important elite surveys (candidates and/or MPs) fielded in the three Southern European countries under scrutiny and offers also some suggestions on how to improve the data collection and management process in studies targeting the whole population or a sample of MPs and/or candidates.
Political Representation in Southern Europe and Latin America.
Freire, A.; Barragán, M.; Coller, X.; Lisi, M.; and Tsatsanis, E.,
editors.
Routledge, 2020.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
@book{freire_political_2020, title = {Political {Representation} in {Southern} {Europe} and {Latin} {America}}, isbn = {978-0-429-40041-4}, url = {https://www.routledge.com/Political-Representation-in-Southern-Europe-and-Latin-America-Crisis-or/Freire-Barragan-Coller-Lisi-Tsatsanis/p/book/9780367022945}, abstract = {This collective volume - with contributions from experts on these regions - examines broader questions about the current crises (The Great Recession and The Commodity Crisis) and the associated changes in political representation in both regions. It provides a general overview of political representation studies in Southern Europe and Latin America and builds bridges between the two traditions of political representation studies, affording greater understanding of developments in each region and promote future research collaboration between Southern Europe and Latin America. Finally, the book addresses questions of continuity and change in patterns of political representation after the onset of the two economic crises, specifically examining issues such as changes in citizens' democratic support and trust in political representatives and institutions, in-descriptive representation (in the sociodemographic profile of MPs) and in-substantive representation (in the link between voters and MPs in terms of ideological congruence and/or policy/issue orientations). This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, political representation, European and Latin American politics/studies, and more broadly to comparative politics.}, urldate = {2020-06-15}, publisher = {Routledge}, editor = {Freire, André and Barragán, Mélany and Coller, Xavier and Lisi, Marco and Tsatsanis, Emmanouil}, year = {2020}, doi = {10.4324/9780429400414}, }
This collective volume - with contributions from experts on these regions - examines broader questions about the current crises (The Great Recession and The Commodity Crisis) and the associated changes in political representation in both regions. It provides a general overview of political representation studies in Southern Europe and Latin America and builds bridges between the two traditions of political representation studies, affording greater understanding of developments in each region and promote future research collaboration between Southern Europe and Latin America. Finally, the book addresses questions of continuity and change in patterns of political representation after the onset of the two economic crises, specifically examining issues such as changes in citizens' democratic support and trust in political representatives and institutions, in-descriptive representation (in the sociodemographic profile of MPs) and in-substantive representation (in the link between voters and MPs in terms of ideological congruence and/or policy/issue orientations). This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of political elites, political representation, European and Latin American politics/studies, and more broadly to comparative politics.
Do parties dislike working-class candidates?.
Wuest, R.
,23. 2020.
Paper
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bibtex
abstract
@article{wuest_parties_2020, title = {Do parties dislike working-class candidates?}, url = {https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:134624}, abstract = {In most democracies, members of parliament tend to be better off than the citizens they are elected to represent. How can we explain why democratic parliaments are systematically run by the affluent? Previous research has mostly focused on the explanation that voters may prefer to elect candidates who are better off than they themselves are. The goal of this paper is to explore an alternative mechanism, viz., whether political parties favor well-off rather than less well-off candidates. To examine this question, I analyze data from the 2007 election to the lower chamber of the Swiss parliament. The results show that parties are more likely to assign favorable party list positions to candidates who are fairly well-off. In particular, I find that parties favor candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class over candidates from the routine working class as well as candidates who are well educated over candidates who are less well educated. These findings suggest that party bias in the candidate nomination process is a factor contributing to the descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class that is so common in current democracies.}, author = {Wuest, Reto}, year = {2020}, pages = {23}, }
In most democracies, members of parliament tend to be better off than the citizens they are elected to represent. How can we explain why democratic parliaments are systematically run by the affluent? Previous research has mostly focused on the explanation that voters may prefer to elect candidates who are better off than they themselves are. The goal of this paper is to explore an alternative mechanism, viz., whether political parties favor well-off rather than less well-off candidates. To examine this question, I analyze data from the 2007 election to the lower chamber of the Swiss parliament. The results show that parties are more likely to assign favorable party list positions to candidates who are fairly well-off. In particular, I find that parties favor candidates from the skilled working class or the core middle class over candidates from the routine working class as well as candidates who are well educated over candidates who are less well educated. These findings suggest that party bias in the candidate nomination process is a factor contributing to the descriptive misrepresentation by income and social class that is so common in current democracies.
Electoral System Incentives for a Party-Serving Personal Vote How Can High Personalization Occur under PR?.
Popescu, M.; and Chiru, M.
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 53(2): 3–24. June 2020.
Publisher: University of California Press
Paper
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link
bibtex
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@article{popescu_electoral_2020, title = {Electoral {System} {Incentives} for a {Party}-{Serving} {Personal} {Vote} {How} {Can} {High} {Personalization} {Occur} under {PR}?}, volume = {53}, issn = {0967-067X}, url = {/cpcs/article/53/2/3/110708/Electoral-System-Incentives-for-a-Party-Serving}, doi = {10.1525/cpcs.2020.53.2.3}, abstract = {Candidate-centric campaigns are most likely to occur when electoral system incentives to personalize do not conflict with party-based incentives. Then it makes sense for candidates to use any campaign mean to improve their chances to win a seat while also helping the party win more seats and increasing their standing within the organization. The Romanian electoral system uniquely combined mechanisms that enabled all three motivations for almost all candidates. Our analysis of the degree and determinants of personalization in the 2012 parliamentary elections illustrates that electoral system incentives were key factors driving campaign personalization as a party-congruent rather than adversarial campaign strategy.}, language = {en}, number = {2}, urldate = {2020-12-15}, journal = {Communist and Post-Communist Studies}, author = {Popescu, Marina and Chiru, Mihail}, month = jun, year = {2020}, note = {Publisher: University of California Press}, pages = {3--24}, }
Candidate-centric campaigns are most likely to occur when electoral system incentives to personalize do not conflict with party-based incentives. Then it makes sense for candidates to use any campaign mean to improve their chances to win a seat while also helping the party win more seats and increasing their standing within the organization. The Romanian electoral system uniquely combined mechanisms that enabled all three motivations for almost all candidates. Our analysis of the degree and determinants of personalization in the 2012 parliamentary elections illustrates that electoral system incentives were key factors driving campaign personalization as a party-congruent rather than adversarial campaign strategy.
2019
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Party institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity.
Mader, M.; and Steiner, N. D.
Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 13(2): 199–224. June 2019.
Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Paper
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@article{mader_party_2019, title = {Party institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity}, volume = {13}, issn = {1865-2646}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12286-019-00421-9}, doi = {10.1007/s12286-019-00421-9}, abstract = {This paper studies the relation between party institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity in democracies. In weakly institutionalized parties, it cannot be taken for granted that party actors have similar policy views because they lack the capability or motivation to coordinate agreement and to recruit personnel in line with this agreement. This should matter most when other safeguards against preference heterogeneity are missing. Empirically, we explore the association between institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity at the level of candidates to the national legislature based on survey data. In a single-country study, we first look at the case of Germany in 2013 and 2017, contrasting the young and weakly institutionalized Alternative for Germany (AfD) with the older, established parties. In a second step, we study the link between party institutionalization and preference homogeneity in a cross-country analysis of 19 established democracies. We find that parties with high value infusion—parties whose candidates are committed to the party—are generally more homogenous in their policy preferences. Moreover, value infusion is more consequential when the issues in question are not constitutive for the party and when candidates are selected in a decentralized way. Similarly, routinization of internal party behavior—the second dimension of institutionalization that we account for—seems to contribute to preference homogeneity only when parties are less policy oriented and have decentralized candidate selection procedures.}, number = {2}, urldate = {2019-09-03}, journal = {Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft}, author = {Mader, Matthias and Steiner, Nils D.}, month = jun, year = {2019}, note = {Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden}, pages = {199--224}, }
This paper studies the relation between party institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity in democracies. In weakly institutionalized parties, it cannot be taken for granted that party actors have similar policy views because they lack the capability or motivation to coordinate agreement and to recruit personnel in line with this agreement. This should matter most when other safeguards against preference heterogeneity are missing. Empirically, we explore the association between institutionalization and intra-party preference homogeneity at the level of candidates to the national legislature based on survey data. In a single-country study, we first look at the case of Germany in 2013 and 2017, contrasting the young and weakly institutionalized Alternative for Germany (AfD) with the older, established parties. In a second step, we study the link between party institutionalization and preference homogeneity in a cross-country analysis of 19 established democracies. We find that parties with high value infusion—parties whose candidates are committed to the party—are generally more homogenous in their policy preferences. Moreover, value infusion is more consequential when the issues in question are not constitutive for the party and when candidates are selected in a decentralized way. Similarly, routinization of internal party behavior—the second dimension of institutionalization that we account for—seems to contribute to preference homogeneity only when parties are less policy oriented and have decentralized candidate selection procedures.
Policy congruence and strategic loyalty: which parties nominate candidates dissatisfied with democracy? Evidence from 11 European countries.
Lewandowsky, M.
Political Research Exchange, 1(1): 1628616. January 2019.
Publisher: Routledge
Paper
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link
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@article{lewandowsky_policy_2019, title = {Policy congruence and strategic loyalty: which parties nominate candidates dissatisfied with democracy? {Evidence} from 11 {European} countries}, volume = {1}, issn = {2474-736X}, url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2474736X.2019.1628616}, doi = {10.1080/2474736X.2019.1628616}, abstract = {This article considers the interplay between the democratic attitudes of candidates and their nomination through political parties. The focus is on candidates who articulate a dissatisfied attitude towards the current status of democracy, and the research interest lies on the parties that might nominate such candidates in national elections. In doing so, the article establishes a link between work on the democratic beliefs of candidates as a specific part of the political elite and literature on party behaviour. The study is grounded in both classical attempts and recent work on political elites and candidate nomination, and its theoretical framework is based on the assumption that parties principally select supportive candidates. Two major mechanisms are investigated: on the one hand, nomination as an expression of policy congruence between the party and its candidates, on the other, candidate nomination as a way to maintain loyalty with the party’s strategic behaviour in parliament. In a first empirical attempt to this research interest, the study analyses data from 76 parties in 11 European countries.}, number = {1}, urldate = {2019-10-15}, journal = {Political Research Exchange}, author = {Lewandowsky, Marcel}, month = jan, year = {2019}, note = {Publisher: Routledge}, keywords = {Political parties, anti-establishment parties, candidates, democratic dissatisfaction, political elites}, pages = {1628616}, }
This article considers the interplay between the democratic attitudes of candidates and their nomination through political parties. The focus is on candidates who articulate a dissatisfied attitude towards the current status of democracy, and the research interest lies on the parties that might nominate such candidates in national elections. In doing so, the article establishes a link between work on the democratic beliefs of candidates as a specific part of the political elite and literature on party behaviour. The study is grounded in both classical attempts and recent work on political elites and candidate nomination, and its theoretical framework is based on the assumption that parties principally select supportive candidates. Two major mechanisms are investigated: on the one hand, nomination as an expression of policy congruence between the party and its candidates, on the other, candidate nomination as a way to maintain loyalty with the party’s strategic behaviour in parliament. In a first empirical attempt to this research interest, the study analyses data from 76 parties in 11 European countries.
Personal ambitions, expertise and parties' control: Understanding committee assignment in the Italian chamber of deputies.
Giannetti, D.; Pedrazzani, A.; and Pinto, L.
Parliamentary Affairs, 72(1): 119–140. January 2019.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
doi link bibtex abstract 1 download
doi link bibtex abstract 1 download
@article{giannetti_personal_2019, title = {Personal ambitions, expertise and parties' control: {Understanding} committee assignment in the {Italian} chamber of deputies}, volume = {72}, issn = {14602482}, doi = {10.1093/pa/gsy013}, abstract = {In this study, we look at committee assignment by focusing on the extent to which MPs’ desires to become members of certain committees are fulfilled. Our theoretical argument is based on the assumption that legislators pursue individ- ual goals, which interact with party leaders’ ones. To test our hypotheses, we use original survey data on elected candidates to the Italian Parliament that were col- lected immediately after the 2013 general election. Our main findings highlight that individual preferences driven by distributive interests are more likely to be ac- commodated in the case of legislators who are close to their party in ideological terms. On the contrary, ideological proximity to the party does not seem to affect committee assignment when MPs’ preferences are driven by expertise-based motivations.}, number = {1}, journal = {Parliamentary Affairs}, author = {Giannetti, Daniela and Pedrazzani, Andrea and Pinto, Luca}, month = jan, year = {2019}, note = {Publisher: Oxford University Press}, keywords = {Committee assignment, Italian parliament, Legislative committees, Legislative organisation, Party unity, Political parties}, pages = {119--140}, }
In this study, we look at committee assignment by focusing on the extent to which MPs’ desires to become members of certain committees are fulfilled. Our theoretical argument is based on the assumption that legislators pursue individ- ual goals, which interact with party leaders’ ones. To test our hypotheses, we use original survey data on elected candidates to the Italian Parliament that were col- lected immediately after the 2013 general election. Our main findings highlight that individual preferences driven by distributive interests are more likely to be ac- commodated in the case of legislators who are close to their party in ideological terms. On the contrary, ideological proximity to the party does not seem to affect committee assignment when MPs’ preferences are driven by expertise-based motivations.
Campaign individualization in a comparative perspective: does the context matter?.
Lisi, M.; and Pereira, J. S.
História: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 9(2): 104–128. 2019.
Paper
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link
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@article{lisi_campaign_2019, title = {Campaign individualization in a comparative perspective: does the context matter?}, volume = {9}, issn = {0871164X}, shorttitle = {Campaign individualization in a comparative perspective}, url = {http://ojs.letras.up.pt/index.php/historia/article/view/6598/6151}, doi = {10.21747/0871164X/hist9_2a6}, abstract = {Despite a great flourishing of studies on election campaigns, the issue of individualized campaigns has been widely neglected, especially from a comparative perspective. Yet, campaigns differ not only in terms of strategy or style, but also with regard to the role played by individual candidates. This article examines the variation of both the communicative focus and the resources used by candidates across different Western democracies. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Surveys (CCS), it tests the impact of several institutional and political features on campaign individualization. Our results show that both electoral systems and the legal framework regulating electoral contests display a significant impact on campaign individualization.}, number = {2}, urldate = {2022-01-12}, journal = {História: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto}, author = {Lisi, Marco and Pereira, José Santana}, year = {2019}, pages = {104--128}, }
Despite a great flourishing of studies on election campaigns, the issue of individualized campaigns has been widely neglected, especially from a comparative perspective. Yet, campaigns differ not only in terms of strategy or style, but also with regard to the role played by individual candidates. This article examines the variation of both the communicative focus and the resources used by candidates across different Western democracies. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Surveys (CCS), it tests the impact of several institutional and political features on campaign individualization. Our results show that both electoral systems and the legal framework regulating electoral contests display a significant impact on campaign individualization.
Elite Surveys.
Andreadis, I.; and Ruth, S. P.
In Hawkins, K.; Carlin, R.; Littvay, L.; and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., editor(s), The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis, pages 112–127. Democracy and Extremism Series, Routledge, 2019.
link bibtex abstract
link bibtex abstract
@incollection{Andreadis2017, title = {Elite {Surveys}}, abstract = {Research on the phenomenon of populism has a long history in Europe and Latin America. Most studies up to now have focused on the clarification of the concept of populism as well as on explaining the success of populist contenders. Recently, empirical research has also advanced in the task of measuring the complexities of populism, e.g. through textual analysis of political speeches or public opinion surveys to measure populist attitudes of voters. However, with the exception of key political figures like presidents, prime ministers, and political parties in general, the inclination of political elites towards populist attitudes has yet to be adequately explored, especially from a comparative perspective. This chapter sets out to close this gap and presents a first glance on two genuine datasets measuring populist attitudes through both candidate and parliamentary elite surveys in Greece and Bolivia.}, booktitle = {The {Ideational} {Approach} to {Populism}: {Concept}, {Theory}, and {Analysis}}, publisher = {Democracy and Extremism Series, Routledge}, author = {Andreadis, Ioannis and Ruth, Saskia P.}, editor = {Hawkins, Kirk and Carlin, Ryan and Littvay, Levente and Rovira Kaltwasser, Cristobal}, year = {2019}, pages = {112--127}, }
Research on the phenomenon of populism has a long history in Europe and Latin America. Most studies up to now have focused on the clarification of the concept of populism as well as on explaining the success of populist contenders. Recently, empirical research has also advanced in the task of measuring the complexities of populism, e.g. through textual analysis of political speeches or public opinion surveys to measure populist attitudes of voters. However, with the exception of key political figures like presidents, prime ministers, and political parties in general, the inclination of political elites towards populist attitudes has yet to be adequately explored, especially from a comparative perspective. This chapter sets out to close this gap and presents a first glance on two genuine datasets measuring populist attitudes through both candidate and parliamentary elite surveys in Greece and Bolivia.
A Comparative Study of the Effects of Electoral Institutions on Campaigns.
Sudulich, L.; and Trumm, S.
British Journal of Political Science, 49(1): 381–399. January 2019.
Paper
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abstract
@article{sudulich_comparative_2019, title = {A {Comparative} {Study} of the {Effects} of {Electoral} {Institutions} on {Campaigns}}, volume = {49}, issn = {0007-1234, 1469-2112}, url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007123416000570/type/journal_article}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123416000570}, abstract = {A long tradition of studies in political science has unveiled the effects of electoral institutions on party systems and parliamentary representation. Yet their effects on campaign activities remain overlooked. Research in this tradition still lacks a strong comparative element able to explore the nuanced role of electoral institutions in shaping individual-level campaigns during first-order parliamentary elections. This study uses data from a variety of national candidate studies to address this lacuna, and shows that the structure of electoral institutions affects the electoral mobilization efforts put in place by candidates. Candidate-centred electoral systems incentivize more intense and complex mobilization efforts, and shift the campaign focus towards individuals rather than parties. By directly addressing the effects of electoral institutions on campaign behaviour, this study contributes to the wider debate on their role in promoting political engagement and mobilization. These results indicate that electoral institutions affect political competition much more than previously thought.}, language = {en}, number = {1}, urldate = {2022-01-12}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, author = {Sudulich, Laura and Trumm, Siim}, month = jan, year = {2019}, pages = {381--399}, }
A long tradition of studies in political science has unveiled the effects of electoral institutions on party systems and parliamentary representation. Yet their effects on campaign activities remain overlooked. Research in this tradition still lacks a strong comparative element able to explore the nuanced role of electoral institutions in shaping individual-level campaigns during first-order parliamentary elections. This study uses data from a variety of national candidate studies to address this lacuna, and shows that the structure of electoral institutions affects the electoral mobilization efforts put in place by candidates. Candidate-centred electoral systems incentivize more intense and complex mobilization efforts, and shift the campaign focus towards individuals rather than parties. By directly addressing the effects of electoral institutions on campaign behaviour, this study contributes to the wider debate on their role in promoting political engagement and mobilization. These results indicate that electoral institutions affect political competition much more than previously thought.
Candidates, Parties and Voters in the Belgian Partitocracy.
Vandeleene, A.; De Winter, L.; and Baudewyns, P.,
editors.
Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2019.
Paper
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abstract
@book{vandeleene_candidates_2019, address = {Cham}, title = {Candidates, {Parties} and {Voters} in the {Belgian} {Partitocracy}}, isbn = {978-3-319-96459-1}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-96460-7}, abstract = {A black box in the study of representation in European democracies is our knowledge about elected but also unelected candidates. What is their background? How are they recruited? What are their campaign aims, strategies, resources and tools? How do they relate to their (constituency and central) party and their voters? How do they consider democratic governance at national and European levels? This book focuses on the triadic relationship between candidates and the other poles of the delegation and accountability triangle: political parties and voters. The chapters rely mostly on the Belgian Candidate Survey (CCS project) gathering about 2000 candidates belonging to 15 parties running for the 2014 federal and regional elections. Most conclusions do not hold only for the Belgian partitocracy but answer broad political science questions on elite recruitment, electoral strategies, personalisation, party cohesion, and descriptive and substantive representation. Its multilevel semi-open electoral system, atypical federal structure, and extreme party system fragmentation make Belgium a rich but complex case offering findings highly relevant to research on candidates in other democracies.}, urldate = {2019-05-04}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, editor = {Vandeleene, Audrey and De Winter, Lieven and Baudewyns, Pierre}, year = {2019}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-96460-7}, }
A black box in the study of representation in European democracies is our knowledge about elected but also unelected candidates. What is their background? How are they recruited? What are their campaign aims, strategies, resources and tools? How do they relate to their (constituency and central) party and their voters? How do they consider democratic governance at national and European levels? This book focuses on the triadic relationship between candidates and the other poles of the delegation and accountability triangle: political parties and voters. The chapters rely mostly on the Belgian Candidate Survey (CCS project) gathering about 2000 candidates belonging to 15 parties running for the 2014 federal and regional elections. Most conclusions do not hold only for the Belgian partitocracy but answer broad political science questions on elite recruitment, electoral strategies, personalisation, party cohesion, and descriptive and substantive representation. Its multilevel semi-open electoral system, atypical federal structure, and extreme party system fragmentation make Belgium a rich but complex case offering findings highly relevant to research on candidates in other democracies.